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IN SEARCH OF THE LINK BETWEEN DUE
PROCESS AND JURISDICTION
STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB*
Jurisdiction offers to one of the parties in litigation the benefit of a
convenient, familiar and, perhaps, friendly forum. If there is a valid
reason to base those benefits merely on who files and who defends the
lawsuit, it must be because of factors internal to the litigation process
because the givens tell us nothing about external context. Such factors
have generally suggested to commentators that a mild preference for
defendants' forums is appropriate. Yet the law has made major shifts
from requiring first, that plaintiffs sue in defendants' forum to requir-
ing, more recently, that defendants come to plaintiffs' forum. Still
more recently, the shift has been to a revitalization of rules favoring
defendants and their forums.2 This instability suggests a basic dissatis-
faction with making jurisdiction turn on party status and invites a
glance at the roots of the decisions.
The Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington4 an-
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School. B.A., 1962, Princeton University; LL.B., 1965,
Yale Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge a substantial debt to Professors Allen Red-
lich, Robert C. Casad, W. William Hodes, Craig M. Lawson, Jerome A. Hoffman, Jacqueline
Parker, and Judith Resnik who read this Article in draft and made many useful comments, to my
fellow conferees at an AALS conference on teaching civil procedure who let me try out some of
my views on them, to my students who have had no choice, and to my research assistants Linda
Oldfield and Angela Panzarella for truly outstanding help. I gladly share the credit for the in-
sights in this Article and keep the blame for its errors.
1. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 591 (1958); Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of ln Per-
sonama.4djudicatory,4uthority, Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 335, 350-54
(1972); Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L.
REv. 1121, 1127-28 (1966). See also Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees:
The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1177-97.
2. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. See cases cited supra note 2. See Chase, In Rem Jurisdiction in a Social Context, 45
BROOKLYN L. REv. 617, 620-27 (1979) (analyzes pre-Shaffer in rem jurisdiction in terms of class
bias); Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Penuefor State and Federal Courts, 66 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 411, 430-61 (1981) (distinguishes territorial power, forum reasonableness, conven-
ience and other nonconstitutional bases of decision). See also supra note 1; infra notes 56 & 83.
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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nounced the principle that assertion of jurisdiction would satisfy due
process so long as the forum state had minimum contacts with the de-
fendants to satisfy notions of fair play and substantial justice.' The
Court, however, left unclear the relationship between the minimum
contacts test and the due process clause. The Court failed to explain
how the test relates to other areas of constitutional doctrine or interpre-
tations of the due process clause.
Prior to 19376 the Court minimized the concurrent powers of state
and federal governments by defining special reserved domains peculiar
to each.7 Similarly, it limited government power over individuals with
a well developed basket of rights protected by the due process clause.8
Jurisdictional limitations fit easily into this approach. States had sover-
eign powers upon which others could not infringe. To determine the
extent of jurisdiction, therefore, one merely had to examine the historic
powers and functions of sister sovereigns.' Prior to International Shoe,
however, and beginning in 1937, the Court adopted a more flexible and
functional approach.' 0 rhe Court abandoned independent limitations
on governmental power based solely on the general language of the
tenth amendment." Fundamental rights like liberty of contract lapsed
into disuse, 12 and the idea that there were matters which Congress
could not touch because they were "local" in nature departed as well.' 3
Due process, stripped of these expansive categories of local or private
rights, remained to be renovated and redesigned.
Inevitably this change had implications for jurisdiction. Because old
notions of inherent power had disappeared, a new understanding of the
reach of state process had to be developed. The functions of the due
process clause, however, have not been easy to determine.' 4 Thus the
interpretation of that clause has become embroiled in new disputes
about the functions of judicial review and the methods of interpreting
5. Id. at 316.
6. See infra text accompanying note 29.
7. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (manufacturing and mining
belong exclusively to the states).
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
11. See United States v. Darby Lumber, Co., 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
12. See supra note 10.
13. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
14. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (reviving substantive due process in the abortion
context).
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the Constitution. 5
The Court's one attempt to set a course in this area before Interna-
tional Shoe was cast in a footnote to United States v. Carolene Products
Co., in which the Court announced the so-called preferred freedoms
theory.'6 In Carolene Products, the Court, acting characteristically for
this period of reinterpretation of the Constitution, deferred to Congress
regarding the reasonableness of regulation. Justice Stone realized,
however, that what might be appropriate in economic regulation might
be less appropriate elsewhere. He was at pains, therefore, to preserve
the freedom of the Court in other areas. In a footnote he added that
deference to Congress might be improper in the face of specific consti-
tutional provisions, infringement of democratic rights, or discrimina-
tion against particular ethnic, racial, religious or insular minorities.
Thus was borne the idea that the Court had a special role to play in
interpreting the Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments. But
Stone, the author of both International Shoe and Carolene Products,
failed to mention these issues in International Shoe.
The purpose of this Article is to locate the sources of jurisdictional
doctrine. A coherent theory of due process ought to help explain and
guide the development of jurisdictional doctrine. In fact, the sources of
due process analysis pose a challenge for jurisdictional doctrine be-
cause they expose both the importance and the irrelevance of jurisdic-
tion to fairness, convenience, and due process.
A correlative issue concerns two major consequences of jurisdiction:
the privilege of collateral attack and the opportunities for review in-
volved in the constitutionalization of the area.' 7 Few of the articulated
explanations for the existing limitations on jurisdiction seem to justify
those remedies. As the doctrinal bases of jurisdiction are explored,
they will also be tested against these consequences of jurisdiction.
I. PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
A. Sovereignty
In early English practice the power of the court to adjudicate often
15. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14-21 (1980); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Pro-
cess-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1070 (1980). See infra text accompanying
notes 54-71.
16. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
17. See Thos. P. Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Producion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d
1247 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding prior judgment invalid).
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depended on obtaining custody of the defendant. 18 The Supreme
Court in Pennoyer v. Neff made jurisdiction depend on the states'
power to seize people and property. 19 The Court in Pennoyer ex-
plained this as a derivative of the sovereignty of each of the states,
though its conclusions were grounded on international law where no
full faith and credit clause operated.
Instead of physical power, sovereignty is now understood to create a
requirement of intent or consent. In Hanson v. Denckla,20 the Supreme
Court allowed trustees to refuse Florida jurisdiction though both the
principals and beneficiaries lived in Florida. In World- Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson,2 the Court permitted an east coast dealer
and distributor of foreign automobiles to refuse jurisdiction in
Oklahoma though a car they sold had injured several people there.
The Court held that unless the defendant purposefully availed itself of
state protections no state jurisdiction was acquired. Purpose, not pres-
ence, defined the outer reaches of jurisdictional doctrine. In explaining
these conclusions the Court in both cases referred to sovereignty. The
Court warned that traditional notions of territorial power still govern,
and explained that this conclusion was grounded in respect for each
state "as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. 22
Quasi in rem jurisdiction similarly had been based on the state's
power over things within its jurisdiction. Property that could be seized
could be subjected to litigation regardless of the whereabouts of the
parties.' In early legal development, debts were analogized to physical
property and subjected to quasi in rem jurisdiction as well.24 These
rules have been drastically overhauled. In Shaffer v. Heitner,25 the
Court held that stock could not be seized in the business' state of incor-
poration as a basis for jurisdiction in unrelated litigation if no other
basis existed.26 In Rush v. Savchuk,27 the Court held that insurance
18. M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, H. SMIT & H. KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 70
(3d ed. 1976).
19. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). See also International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
20. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
21. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22. Id. at 292.
23. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
24. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
25. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
26. Id. at 204 n.20, 212.
27. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
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obligations could not be seized as a basis of jurisdiction against the
policyholders.2" In Shaffer and Rush quasi in rem jurisdiction was
largely eliminated. The Court refocused its inquiry from the location
of the debt to the activities of the debtor-a result consistent with its
concept of sovereignty, as it had been defined in the personal jurisdic-
tion cases, which were avowedly based on sovereignty.
In a series of decisions beginning in 1937, however, sovereignty and
inherent state powers began to lose their explanatory force.29 It was in
keeping with these developments that the Court in International Shoe
expanded interterritorial state power at the expense of impermeable
state boundaries. When the Court in Hanson and World- Wide Volk-
swagen revived the idea of sovereignty, it did not function against a
background of clearly defined sovereign powers but of a functional ap-
proach to state needs.
Nevertheless, when focusing on state needs rather than concepts of
inherent powers, it is difficult to understand how sovereignty explains
the jurisdictional results. Sovereignty may be viewed from two practi-
cal perspectives: the needs of the parties and the needs of the state.
For parties primarily interested in relief, sovereignty between unrelated
nations poses a barrier because they may be unwilling to enforce each
others' judgments.30 Without dominion over person or property there
may be little point in assuming jurisdiction. Among the states, how-
ever, unlike the community of nations, the enforcement of judgments is
affected by the full faith and credit clause. The Court in Pennoyer v.
Neff solved the problem of enforcement by equating the requirements
of due process with those of full faith and credit. 31 The Court held that
Oregon had denied due process to Neff, an out-of-state defendant, by
purporting to entertain litigation against him personally. On that
ground the Court concluded that Oregon's judgment would not be enti-
tled to full faith and credit elsewhere. Conversely, had Oregon prop-
erly obtained jurisdiction under the fourteenth amendment its
judgment would have been entitled to full faith and credit under article
four of the Constitution. That in turn meant that the prevailing party
would have been entitled to obtain satisfaction against Neff's out-of-
28. Id. at 328.
29. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
30. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977); Kurland, supra note 1, at 585.
31. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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state property. As a result of Pennoyer, the states are now generally
required to enforce each other's judgments if the court of the forum
state had proper jurisdiction. Thus, the significance of state sovereignty
diminished to the extent that the problem of enforceability faded.
Another aspect of sovereignty is the interest or needs of the states.3 2
It is not entirely clear, however, what risk to the interests of the states
the Court is trying to protect through the medium of jurisdictional
rules. The state has an interest in the well-being of its citizens, resi-
dents, and transients within its borders. Those interests would prove
too much, however, for they are always present. The state has an inter-
est in the enforcement of its own laws wherever they apply. Thus, a
party to the litigation might assert that jurisdiction should be consistent
with decisions governing the forum's choice of law.
Although relevant, the Court in Hanson refused to equate choice of
law with jurisdiction.33 The state's interest in the enforcement of its
laws can be satisfied through litigation in other forums. 34 Moreover,
under current doctrine the action is still transitory.35 Several compet-
ing jurisdictions are frequently available; the defendant can be sued
where the events took place, but also, among other possibilities, where
he lives. Making actions transitory threatens the enforceability of state
law when a multitude of plaintiffs are permitted a similar choice of
forum. Thus, in Rush3 6 plaintiffs were plainly escaping an Indiana
guest statute. It is hard to rest on the damage to the Indiana interests
32. See Smit, supra note 1 (arguing that the state interest in the transaction is a ground for
asserting jurisdiction). The Court, in assessing the inconvenience to litigants, does give some con-
sideration to the state interests. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
292 (1980).
33. 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977).
34. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CI. L. REv. 620, 635-38
(1954). See also Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note I, at 1128-33.
35. See Developments in The Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 1012
(1960).
36. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Underlying Rush were a number of problems of potential liability
for the individual defendant. Most of those problems were present in the Louisiana direct action
statute which the Court had sustained in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1954), which authorized a direct action against the insurance company on the policy. The Rush
Court distinguished Watson but gave no indication that it was undermining it. Most of those
difficulties could be solved, moreover, without denying plaintiffits choice of forum. Minichiello v.
Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 844 (1969); Simpson v. Loehmann,
21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967). See Justice Stevens' dissent in Rush, 444
U.S. at 333.
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involved because guest statutes have declined radically in popularity 7
and many courts feel free to apply their own more liberal laws.38 Nev-
ertheless, if plaintiffs were allowed jurisdiction based on attachment of
insurance policies, the common presence of insurance companies
throughout the nation would allow plaintiffs to select forums noted for
the highest awards. In large cases they might even move to establish
residence if that were required. The result would be that insurance
rates and premiums for the nation would be defined by the standards of
a few generous jurisdictions. That kind of open ended forum shopping
poses a true threat to sister state policies, although the Court in Rush
did not seem to rely on this ground.
This would not have been true of the Louisiana direct-action statute
sustained in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.39 Louisi-
ana permitted the plaintiff to sue the tortfeasor's liability insurer as
party-defendant if, but only if, the tort had been committed in Louisi-
ana. Louisiana courts would be unavailable in cases of out-of-state
torts despite the presence of liability carriers in Louisiana. Thus, plain-
tiffs could not generally seize upon advantageous provisions of Louisi-
ana law to circumvent law applicable in their own states. Few long
arm statutes, however, permit that wide a latitude for forum shopping.
In addition to unlimited forum shopping, the Court expressed con-
cern in World- Wide Volkswagen about defendants' ability to plan their
liabilities.4" It insisted on jurisdictional rules which would affect the
parties' actions and on which they could rely. Conversely, the Court
expressed concern in Kulko v. Superior Court about the effect of juris-
dictional rules on the private, cooperative behavior of the parties.4
The opinion in Kulko supports a narrow rule: jurisdictional choices
which affect the private prelitigation behavior of the parties are disfa-
vored. This conclusion may sensibly be grounded on the effect on fed-
eral or sister state interests. The threat to state law is a problem in the
matrimonial area because parties are likely to temper their activities
with a look at the jurisdictional consequences. Although it is a matter
37. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICrs LAW 190 n.3 (3d ed. 1977); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 279-80, 279 n.40 (2d ed. 1980).
38. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 37, at 329.
39. 348 US. 66 (1954). Such ousting of local regulation has been the result of corporate
freedom to domesticate itself at will and the common choice of Delaware as a state of
incorporation.
40. 444 U.S. at 297.
41. 436 U.S. 86, 97-98 (1978).
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of considerable anguish to lawyers who deal with domestic matters, it is
necessary for them to advise their clients of the legal consequences of
efforts to cooperate with or reconcile themselves with their spouses.
Hence, state policies seeking reconciliation and cooperation would be
frustrated by jurisdictional rules which make the substantive rules
change to the detriment of cooperating parties. The Supreme Court's
reinterpretation of purposeful availment in Kulko rests on a firm foun-
dation insofar as it avoided jurisdictional doctrine which would have
required Mr. Kulko to defend himself against support claims in Cali-
fornia because of his willingness to let his children join their mother
there.
In World- Wide Volkswagen it is difficult to identify any policy of the
sister state that may be affected by Oklahoma's assertion ofjurisdiction.
Conflicts principles could be asserted to apply New York law to the
dealer's duty of care.4 2 Open ended forum shopping is not a problem
because the accident was local. One is tempted, however, to treat the
decision as a derivative of the commerce clause.43 Because most long
arm statutes provide narrower bases of jurisdiction against foreigners
than residents, outright discrimination against interstate commerce is
not the issue.44 Nevertheless, there may be an effect on interstate com-
merce. The Audi dealer in New York might refuse to deal with people
headed for other states. Presumably knowledgeable customers under a
contrary rule would be equally motivated to restrict their dealings with
dealers beyond the borders of their intended or expected home state.
42. Conflicts principles function independently ofjurisdiction in an effort to reflect the intent
of the parties, A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 493-97 (1962), or otherwise
to apply the most appropriate law. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 37, at 335-41 (interest analysis
applied to products liability). There may be valid reasons for applying either Oklahoma or New
York law in either forum and under either modem law, A. EHRENZWEIO, supra, at 497 (the exist-
ence of implied warranties treated as a matter of construction of the contract) or traditional law,
R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 37, at 336-37. But see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)
(constitutional principles leave wide discretion in state choice of law); U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (forum
rule may predominate).
43. Cf. White v. Southern Pac. Co., 386 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1965) (injury to passenger-plaintiff,
held plaintifis forum burden on commerce); Hayman v. Southern Pac. Co., 278 S.W.2d 749 (Mo.
1955) (same; injury to employee); Glaser v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 16, 196 A.2d
539 (1963) (passenger plaintitfs forum burdened commerce).
44. See, eg., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (state job discrimination voided on the
basis of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV); Dean Milk Co, v. City of Madison, 340
U.S. 349 (1951) (commerce clause barred restriction of area of supply). But see Baldwin v. Mon-
tana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (rate discrimination in favor of resident hunters
upheld against privileges and immunities and equal protection challenges).
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Plainly economic constraints would limit this aversive behavior of both
parties. The burden, however, must rest somewhere and if there are
good reasons to locate trials in distant forums, a commerce clause anal-
ysis would not prove as firm a barrier as World- Wide Volkswagen."
Indeed, it might be better for the Court to defer to Congress rather than
interpose its own judgment.'
Although there are legitimate state and federal concerns, the parties'
behavior is a relatively poor test of sovereign interests. This approach
entirely sidesteps evaluation of the impact on acts of Congress and sis-
ter-state legislation. By making behavior the test of jurisdiction, the
impact on commerce is aggravated. Although substituting purpose for
underlying policies is typical of the Court's treatment of large areas of
constitutional law,47 it is out of line with the substance of commerce
clause doctrine which accords considerable latitude to the states where
legitimate interests are pursued in a nondiscriminatory manner.48 It is
also out of line with the structure of the due process clause. Sover-
eignty does not have a place in the original design of the due process
clause.4 9 The Court has become very restrained in its use of the idea of
sovereignty. 0 It is difficult to argue that sovereignty, as employed by
World- Wide Volkswagen and Hanson, serves some essential function in
the constitutional scheme.5
Moreover, concern with the impact on federal and sister-state inter-
ests has a very problematic relationship to the right of collateral attack.
45. The issue under the commerce clause will be the reasonableness of the burden; it will not
be enough to show that a burden exists. Kassel v. Consolidated Freight Ways Corp., 450 U.S. 662
(1981).
46. Id. at 688-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Cf. Blumstein, Some Intersections ofthe
Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax
Treatment of Out-of-State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REV. 473, 486-87 n.53, 488-89 n.60
(1978) (substituting categories for standards).
48. See American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Com'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d
691 (1973) (summarizing the negative commerce clause cases).
49. See generally Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical
Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981).
50. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (state sovereignty no barrier to
federal taxation of state enterprise); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (state
sovereignty no barrier to federal regulation of "local" activities). But see National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (state sovereignty a barrier to federal regulation of hours and
wages of state employees).
51. Cf. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) (arguing
that it is appropriate to interpret the Constitution on the basis of its federal structure).
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Washington University Open Scholarship
1300 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
A party defendant may ignore a proceeding having an inadequate ju-
risdictional basis and seek to nullify it in later litigation.52 This privi-
lege is one of the major distinctions between jurisdictional disputes
under the Constitution and venue disputes pursuant to statute. Theo-
retically, the right of collateral attack may help to protect state inter-
ests. Practically, however, this is a hazardous course for defendants
and few employ it. The rights protected via collateral attack are not
state rights, which the parties can waive in any case, but are economic
rights to a cheaper though riskier forum in smaller cases. 3
Protecting state and federal policies from behavior induced by juris-
dictional rules is poorly accomplished by the existing volitional rules.
Much more effective in protecting federal and state policies would be
precisely what the Court feared-a rule which makes it impossible for a
party to predict the jurisdictional consequences of its behavior and thus
to avoid subjection to unwanted legislation or judicial construction.
B. Sel/determination
If sovereignty or federalism does not explain current jurisdictional
rules, then other approaches may. Stone's formulation of the preferred
freedoms doctrine in the famous Carolene Products footnote 4 may pro-
vide some support for the standards of purposeful availment of the pro-
tections of a state as a requisite ofjurisdiction. The notion of preferred
freedoms is'shorthand for the concept that the Constitution should be
interpreted to protect citizens' right to a voice in government. It is no
trick to show that the right of representation was foremost in the minds
of those who wrote and ratified the constitutional provisions from 1787
through 179 1.55 The quintessential example of the voiceless person is
the alien. 6 There must be special justification for a government to as-
sume dominion over a person not voting for representatives. Indeed,
diversity jurisdiction is aimed precisely at this problem.5 7 The alien's
52. 1 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.14616] (1976).
53. See infra Appendix I.
54. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
55. J. ELY, supra note 15, at 73-104.
56. Id. at 161-62. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966) (first
amendment considerations require greater contacts to subject out of state defendant to jurisdiction
in libel cases).
57. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVIsION OF JURISDIcTIoN BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
99 (1969); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-8
(1968).
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problem in turn is composed of two difficulties: the right to regulate
personal conduct so that he does not submit himself to the processes of
a distant or unfriendly jurisdiction, and fairness when submitting to
jurisdiction.
Some maintain that the right to regulate one's own conduct, or per-
sonal autonomy, is at the root of due process." If so, it would explain
the development before International Shoe of consent as a basis for ju-
risdiction. 9  The Court in World- Wide Volkswagen60 and Shaffer6 1
seems to have adopted the language of autonomy when it focused on
affirmative acts signifying willingness to undertake burdens that would
predictably subject the defendant to jurisdiction.62
Although self-determination is attractive as a basis for jurisdiction
and could be firmly grounded in constitutional jurisprudence, it has not
proven very satisfying in practice. Autonomy rarely has been accepted
by the Court in other contexts. 63 Moreover, one cannot protect auton-
omy by reading into complex behavior an acquiescence in jurisdiction.
In interstate contracts, jurisdiction frequently is a by-product of the
contracting parties' conduct rather than an intentional result.64 Where
acquiescence in jurisdiction is not an accident, it may be an unaccept-
able result of overreaching.65 In cases where jurisdiction is based on
accidental contact, fiction is elevated above reality if jurisdiction is
based on self-determination.66
More fundamentally, however, while express consent follows directly
from self-determination, implied consent, on which the modern cases
rest, is inherently circular. The underlying law must be referred to
before consent can be implied. Persons rarely, if ever, willingly consent
to distant jurisdiction. A person consents if, but only if, the law sub-
58. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501-06, 559-93 (1978); Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-50 (1976). See, e.g., Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
59. Kurland, supra note 1, at 576-90.
60. 444 U.S. at 297.
61. 433 U.S. at 216.
62. 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
63. See L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at 504-06.
64. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Southern Mach. Co.
v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
65. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 326-29 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
66. See Kurland, supra note 1, at 578-82.
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jects to liability his property as in Balk, or person as defined in Pen-
noyer, or business as in World- Wide Volkswagen.67 It would be more
realistic to find an independently defined expectation of fairness than
to infer a specific acceptance of jurisdiction. Moreover, it is not clear
why due process would compel an asymmetrical focus on defendant's
but not plaintiff's consent. Theories of self-determination do not seem
to support the Court's use of constructive purpose.
C. Fairness
The minimum contacts test announced in International Shoe may
also be designed to prevent prejudice to a party by avoiding states in
which there may be bias against the defendant without a discussion of
the likelihood of local prejudice against out-of-state persons. The issue
of prejudice against the defendant has been important in the defama-
tion cases68 and can be equally important where a dispute spans inter-
national borders.69 By requiring that defendant have minimum contact
with a forum state before jurisdiction may be asserted, the Court gives
some warning to individuals that a certain amount of contact with a
specific state will subject them to that state's jurisdiction. A policy of
preventing prejudice, however, would push the Court in the direction
of preferring disinterested jurisdictions rather than interested ones.70
Moreover, the availability of federal courts in diversity cases should
have some impact on the fairness question. Far from preferring disin-
terested jurisdictions, some courts have given greater deference to state
power in those cases where prejudice in the forum might be greater-
suits by the forum state itself.7 No doctrine which repeatedly confines
jurisdiction to the residence of either party can consistently achieve fair
results.
Because neither self-determination nor disinterested decisionmaking
67. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
68. Edwards v. Associated Press, 512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1975); Buckley v. New York Post
Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966);
Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964); Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536 (5th
Cir. 1964). See also P. CARRINOTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE 936-41 (2d ed. 1977).
69. See, e.g., Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (such forums would gen-
erally lack sufficient contact with the parties or event to assert jurisdiction). Perhaps even some
form of elimination or random selection as in arbitrator or jury selection would be a better
example.
71. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
[Vol. 60:1291
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/3
SEARCH OF DUE PROCESS-JURISDICTION LINK
give strong support to the current rules, it is difficult to base purposeful
availment on the preferred freedoms approach. A final though unar-
ticulated possibility is that the minimum contacts test focuses on a dif-
ferent conception of fairness-one which assumes the responsibility of
the defendant for the tort or breach.72 The idea is that the defendant
should return to the same place where he did the harm. That rationale,
however, assumes that the defendant did the harm before providing
him the opportunity to prove otherwise.
D. A Summary on Purpose
Of the rationales discussed thus far-sovereignty, self-determination,
and fairness-concern with that aspect of fairness which involves the
risk of prejudice against the defendant alone would support the right of
collateral attack and the excuse from contesting jurisdiction in the
other party's forum.73 If a party cannot get a fair hearing on the merits
then there is reason for concern that the party cannot get a fair hearing
on the jurisdictional issue either. As pointed out above, however, the
rules do not prescribe a search for neutrality.74
With respect to each of the rationales, there is a poor match between
the operation of jurisdictional rules and the purposes for which they are
invoked. Whatever value may remain in these theories of federal rela-
tions and individual choices, due process clearly involves much more.
Most basic to due process is the reliability, accuracy, and equality of
the decisionmaking process.75
II. CONVENIENCE AND RELATED JUSTIFICATIONS
A. The Meaning of International Shoe
Before the decision in International Shoe, a defendant corporation
could be required to defend itself in states where it had been "doing
business." Doing business had become the test for the much older con-
72. The Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927), approved a state stat-
ute which "require[d] a nonresident to answer for his conduct." The Illinois Supreme Court in
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766
(1961), said that "it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defect in
those products." But neither case seems to rest on this moralistic ground.
73. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
74. See supra notes 70-71.
75. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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cepts of corporate presence and consent.76 International Shoe gave the
doing business test a new rationale but did not change the law. 77 Jus-
tice Stone's discussion of the convenience of the parties in International
Shoe made sense in the domain of the doing business test. A corpora-
tion, or individual, doing regular and systematic business in a state
would presumably find little difficulty in defending litigation there. A
corporation only sporadically involved in the state, however, might find
many burdens in addition to the ordinary burden of litigation.
Although entirely by dicta, International Shoe wrought major
changes in other areas ofjurisdiction. International Shoe has now been
understood to limit the use of in rem jurisdiction.78 International Shoe
also expanded jurisdiction based on single transactional contacts, the
so-called minimum contacts with a state. This greatly expanded long
arm jurisdiction.
The main rationale of the minimum contacts test was fairness. 79
Judge Hand made this connection in 1930, by suggesting "an estimate
of the inconveniences" to the defendant in defending where he has
been sued, as a test for jurisdiction. 0 Justice Stone, writing for the
Court in International Shoe, borrowed Judge Hand's language and held
that "[a]n 'estimate of the inconvenience' which would result to the cor-
poration from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of busi-
ness is relevant" to determining what contacts satisfy the demands of
due process.8'
In Traveler' Health Association v. Virginias2 the Court, in dictum,
gave a hint of what it had intended by that language in International
Shoe:
Moreover, if Virginia is without power to require this Association to
accept service of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the only
forum for injured certificate holders might be Nebraska. Health benefit
claims are seldom so large that Virginia policyholders could afford the
76. 326 U.S. at 317-18. See Kurland, supra note 1, at 584.
77. 326 U.S. at 317-19. See Kurland, supra note 1, at 586.
78. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
79. 326 U.S. at 316-20.
80. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930). Judge Hand stated:
"[T]he controlling consideration, expressed shortly by the word 'presence,' but involving an esti-
mate of the inconveniences which would result from requiring it to defend, where it has been
sued." Id at 141.
81. 326 U.S. at 317.
82. 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950). See Kurland, supra note 1, at 593-98.
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/3
SEARCH OF DUE PROCESS-JURISDICTION LINK
expense and trouble of a Nebraska law suit. In addition, suits on alleged
losses can be more conveniently tried in Virginia where witnesses would
most likely live and where claims for losses would presumably be investi-
gated. Such factors have been given great weight in applying the doctrine
of forum non conveniens. . . . And prior decisions of this Court have re-
ferred to the unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of permitting policyhold-
ers to seek redress only in some distant state ...
The Court amplified these themes and gave considerable stimulus to
long-arm jurisdiction in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. s3
Mrs. McGee, a California resident, claimed to be the beneficiary of an
insurance policy issued by International Life, whose company offices
were in Texas. Mrs. McGee sued in California. The United States
Supreme Court found that International Life had minimum contacts in
California and that the California courts could therefore assert jurisdic-
tion. The Supreme Court's decision might be seen merely as an exten-
sion of Traveler's Health except that the language of contacts appears
to apply equally to either party: "It is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that State." 4 International Life might have beaten
Mrs. McGee to the courthouse and sued for declaratory judgment.8 5
The question arises whether the company could have sued Mrs. McGee
in Texas. One can argue about who initiated the insurance contract86
but it is not difficult to assume symmetrical relationships or a very dif-
ferent sequence of events between the parties. Thus, a minimum con-
tacts analysis yields the conclusion that the suit could have been
brought in either jurisdiction. 7 The Court's discussion of the hardship
to claimants who cannot afford suits in foreign jurisdictions is, how-
ever, reminiscent of the dicta in Traveler's Health and appears to deny
the reversibility of McGee:8 "When claims were small or moderate
individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an
action in a foreign forum---thus in effect making the company judg-
83. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
84. Id. at 223.
85. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
86. 355 U.S. at 221.
87. Professor Ehrenzweig reached a similar conclusion. Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction
to Interstate Venue, 50 OR. L. REv. 103, 104 (1971). See also Carrington & Martin, Substantive
Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MicH. L. REv. 227, 230-42 (1967).
88. 355 U.S. at 223.
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ment proof. Often the crucial witnesses-as here on the company's de-
fense of suicide-will be found in the insured's locality."
It is not clear to what extent this discussion might have been illustra-
tive or crucial to the holding of the Court. McGee has not been easy
for the lower courts to interpret. Many courts have developed a twin
test for jurisdiction: convenience and contacts.8 9 One court may have
modified its reading of the minimum contacts test as a result of incon-
venience.90 This view of McGee implies that there would be no juris-
diction in Texas if the company had sought to sue Mrs. McGee there.
But the bifurcation of contacts and convenience leaves the source of the
minimum contacts test unclear. Other courts have read McGee as
broadening jurisdiction rather than as restricting jurisdiction on a pro-
crustean bed of convenience. 91 This view displaces contacts with con-
venience. Presumably then, Mrs. McGee could be sued in Texas, even
though she lived in California.
Whichever interpretation of McGee is used, however, the Court's at-
tempt to ground minimum contacts on social justice has proven as ster-
ile as its oblations to territorial sovereignty. The two simply are no
longer treated as related ideas. Hansen,92 Shaffer,93 and World- Wide
89. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 1974). See Vencedor
Mfg. Co. v. Gougler Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d 886, 893 (1st Cir. 1977) ("Trial convenience is not the
ruling consideration in jurisdiction cases. . . but it is always helpful"); First Nat'l Bank v. White,
420 F. Supp. 1331, 1336-37 (D. Minn. 1976) (sufficient contacts to satisfy jurisdiction but forum
inconvenient and case transferred).
Courts have declined to find jurisdiction in districts which would have provided a compara-
tively convenient trial location. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 504
(4th Cir. 1956) (involving defects which appeared in plaintiff's forum); Chemical Separations
Corp. v. Trevor Boyce Assocs. Inc., 305 F. Supp. 427 (D. Alaska 1969) (defect appeared in forum);
Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (accident in third-party plaintiff's
forum). Courts have found jurisdiction despite the absence of convenient witnesses. Ceravit
Corp. AG v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 46 Misc. 2d 979, 260 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Term. 1965)
(concerning damaged goods shipped from Philadelphia to Europe). But see Fourth Northwestern
Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962) (no jurisdiction in incon-
venient forum despite possible contacts).
90. See Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.), cer. denied, 404 U.S. 948
(1971).
91. The Supreme Court has referred to McGee to explain the relaxation of due process as a
guarantee against inconvenience, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at
292-93, and as broadening plaintiff's choice of forum on the basis of consideration of the interests
of forum and plaintiff, see id at 292; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 86, 92 (1978). See, e.g.,
Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 292 n.5 (7th Cir. 1976). See also cases cited supra note 89
(finding jurisdiction in inconvenient locations).
92. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
93. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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Volkswagen 94 made it clear that convenience without contacts does not
support jurisdiction. The Court in those cases sought some purposeful
availment of the states' facilities. Also present were some glimmerings
of a resource oriented inquiry. In World- Wide Volkswagen, Justice
Marshall stated in his dissent that the defendant could pay litigation
costs out of profits or by self-insurance. 95 In Rush, however, Marshall
changed his position in speaking for the Court and stated that insur-
ance was inadequate and the availability of defendant insurance com-
panies in all fifty states and the District of Columbia contradicts the
existence of jurisdictional contacts with any of those states by illustrat-
ing the insignificance of those contacts with the subject matter of the
litigation.96 On convenience grounds the availability of the insurance
company defendants would be a reason to allow individual plaintiffs an
advantage. Marshall then explained Shaffer 97 as requiring a showing
of purposefulness by the defendants and not as requiring that the prop-
erty seized as a basis for jurisdiction bear any relationship to the suit or
ordinarily suggest a convenient place of trial.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in both World- Wide Volkswagen and
Rush, rejected the focus on the defendant. Quoting Justice Black, who
had written both Travelers Health and McGee, Justice Brennan urged
the Court in World- Wide Volkswagen to let the state entertain the suit
unless the burden were too great.98 He argued that contacts was not the
sole message of International Shoe: "Surely International Shoe contem-
plated that the significance of the contacts necessary to support jurisdic-
tion would diminish if some other consideration helped establish that
jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable."99 He then analyzed the de-
fendant's actual burden"° and concluded that the insurer's presence
minimizes that burden.' 0'
These resource questions may fit more comfortably in traditional
venue doctrine.10 2 It is worth noting in this connection the Court's de-
94. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
95. Id. at 317 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980).
97. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
98. 444 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 300.
100. Id. a 300-01.
101. Id. at 303.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 108-13.
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cision in Stafford v. Briggs."°3 Writing for the Court, Justice Burger
focused on the availability of government counsel in all fifty states to
protect federal defendants and travel at government expense, both of
which are available to federal defendants during, but not always after,
government service.'0 The doctrinal result of Volkswagen and Rush,
however, was not convenience but intent.
Applying the teaching of those cases to Mrs. McGee and her insur-
ance company could yield the conclusion that neither had taken such
purposeful action toward the other party's jurisdiction. Perhaps it does
not matter where the suit is brought. Jurisdiction may just depend on
the identity of who becomes the defendant. Some lower courts have
explicitly labelled the burden of defense as a secondary
consideration. 10 5
Underlining the fact that jurisdictional doctrine is not based on fair-
ness, the search for convenience, which is important in achieving a fair
result, 'is often carried out under other provisions. California, for ex-
ample, accounts for differences among litigants, 0 6 while New York
provides for special forums in consumer cases.10 7 One group of states
has included within its jurisdictional statutes authority to dismiss cases
on the ground that the forum is inconvenient. 0 8 Courts in a number of
103. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
104. Id. at 544.
105. Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978) (five factors,
contacts primary, relationship essential, convenience secondary); Gardner Eng'g Corp. v. Page
Eng'g Co., 484 F.2d 27, 32 (8th Cir. 1973) (secondary factor and not all factors need to be present);
Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 191 (8th Cir. 1965) (one of two secondary factors).
106. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 483.010 (Deering 1982) (restrictions on availability of at-
tachment against noncommercial defendants and on goods for personal use).
107. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 503(f) (McKinney 1976); N.Y. CITY CIv. CT. ACT § 301 (McKin-
ney 1963 & Supp. 1981-82). See also Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817, 821-22,
833-35, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749-50, 761-63 (1972) (en banc).
108. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2502E (1979); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.30 (Deering 1972
& Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13.425 (1981 &
Supp. 1982); IND. R. TRIAL Acc. 4.4(c); MD. CTS. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-104 (1980 &
Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1982); NED.
REv. STAT. § 25-538 (1979); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAWS § 327 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1981); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-75.12 (1969 & Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.05 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1981); PA, CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (Purdon 1980); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.63 (West
1977 & Supp. 1982).
In addition several states make special provisions for defendants in long-arm jurisdiction cases.
Michigan requires plaintiff to post a bond for costs on defendant's motion in cases of long-arm
jurisdiction. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.741 (1976 & Supp. 1982). New Hampshire includes a
special provision for continuance in long-arm cases. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.4 (1968 &
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/3
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other states have, without express statutory authority, assumed that
power.' 9 The considerations involved are well stated in the federal
transfer of venue statute, though the latter was intended to be used far
more frequently than dismissal for lack of a convenient forum:
"(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought.""'
It has not been clear what significance is to be accorded the resources
available to the parties for venue purposes. Some courts have overrid-
den asserted inequalities"'I while others have focused on the different
resources available to the parties."' Both conceptions of conven-
Supp. 1981). Washington provides attorneys fees for successful defendants in long-arm cases. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (1969 & Supp. 1981).
109. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.29 (2d ed. 1977). The doctrine was
adopted by the federal courts in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 44 (3d ed. 1976).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) This section was enacted to build on the
emerging doctrine of forum non conveniens. See 1 J. MOORE, supra note 52, at 0.145[5].
111. In a number of cases courts have overruled claims based on hardship. In Klepper Krop,
Inc. v. Hanford, 411 F. Supp. 276 (D. Neb. 1976), the court was unwilling to consider a mere
difference in the income and resources of the parties. In several cases the court overruled claims
of hardship on the stated ground of lack of proof. In First Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 380 F. Supp. 782
(W.D. Mo. 1974), the bank sued the defendant on a note. A suit on a note often requires little of
the plaintiff's time and money in the absence of significant defenses. The court said that the
defendant had not presented any specific factual data regarding his financial condition or identi-
fied witnesses or documents located in Oklahoma that he believed necessary. On those grounds
the court refused the transfer. In contrast, see First Nat'l Bank v. White, 420 F. Supp. 1331 (D.
Minn. 1976), another promissory note case in which the court granted the defendant debtor's
motion for a transfer of venue where the defendant showed facts proving hardship. In another
field, see Vaughn v. American Basketball Ass'n, 419 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which a
professional basketball player sued his team and his league. In Vaughn, the court refused to credit
plaintiff's hardship claim and granted that defendant's motion for a transfer when the defendant
showed that all the acts complained of occurred.
Finally, there are several shareholder suits in which, despite apparently sizable differences in
the resources of the parties, the court honored the venue wishes of the defendant corporation. See
Abramson v. INA Capital Management Corp., 459 F. Supp. 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Blanning v.
Tisch, 378 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Scheinbart v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 367 F. Supp.
707 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). As noted before, plaintiffs do not finance their own shareholder litigation.
Hence, these cases do not conflict with the objective of giving priority to the resource issue. This
partly reflects the distinction drawn between factors which demand an initial choice of forum
which respects the parties' resources and subsequent decisions respecting the place of trial.
See generally Comment, Factors of Choice for Venue Transfer Under 28 U.S.C § 1404(a), 41
CALIF. L. REV. 507 (1953).
112. See General Portland Cement Co. v. Perry, 204 F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1953) ("Such a
denial of the plaintiff's cause of action could not be 'in the interest of justice.' "); Aamco Auto-
matic Transmissions, Inc. v. Bosemer, 374 F. Supp. 754, 757 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("[In the interests of
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ience--overall economy and resources-embodied in the transfer stat-
ute and forum non conveniens doctrine are once again subordinated to
the independent requirements of jurisdiction. Though the plaintiff can
request a transfer,"I3 neither venue nor forum non conveniens expands
his choices by overriding the restrictions of jurisdiction. When conven-
ience is assessed in the context of determination of motions to transfer
or dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, relief is discretion-
ary."14  New York courts have refused motions to deny jurisdiction
where one party is a resident of the state."-' Others simply place a
heavy burden on defendants seeking to have jurisdiction denied.' 16
Thus, there is tension not only among convenience factors but between
the volitional rules of jurisdictional doctrine and the economic consid-
erations of a policy based on convenience." t7
justice the relative bargaining power and financial status of the parties must also be considered.");
Goldstein v. Rusco Indus. Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying transfer despite
possibly higher costs since "the court cannot overlook the relative means of the parties."); Hyde
Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1212 (S.D. Miss. 1969) (courts should consider
"[tlhe parties' relative financial ability to bear expenses of a trial in a particular forum"); Leopard
Roofing Co. v. Asphalt Roofing Indus. Bureau, 190 F. Supp. 726, 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1960) ("plain-
tills financial plight may prevent it from continuing the case in this Court if the motion to transfer
is denied. ... Whatever inconvenience that may be caused to defendants because of the distance
factor would not outweigh the injustice that would result to plaintiff. . . ."); Grubs v. Consoli-
dated Freightways, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 404, 410 (D. Mont. 1960) ("The ability of the respective
litigants to bear the expenses of trial in a particular forum may be considered."); Miller v. NBC
Inc., 143 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D. Del. 1956) ("This balance could not help but favor transfer to New
York if it were not necessary to consider the circumstances apart from convenience of parties and
witnesses which have a direct bearing on the interest ofjustice .... [Ilt must be assumed plaintiff
will be deprived of counsel and thus unable to prosecute his action if this matter were transferred
to New York." [transfer denied]); Keller-Dorian Colorfilm Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 88 F.
Supp. 863, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) ("While this does not mean that Kodak should be subjected to suit
in any forum simply to vex or harass it into settlement of an unfounded and unjust claim... the
relative ability of the litigants to bear the expenses of trial in any particular forum must be consid-
ered in weighing what the interests of justice require .... [Transfer denied because the cost) will
be so prohibitive and so beyond its [plaintiffs] capacity that it will, in effect, be denied an opportu-
nity to adequately present its proof'); Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 319,
327 (D. Del. 1949) ("no court would ever find transfer to a forum which is financially out of reach
of an impecunious plaintiff to be in the 'interest of justice' ").
Some courts have also considered the specific litigation history of the parties. See, e.g., Henry v.
First Nat'l Bank, 50 F.R.D. 251, 269 (N.D. Miss. 1970) ("Counsel for all parties in the case partici-
pate frequently in litigation before this court at all division points.").
113. 1 J. MOOR, supra note 52, at % 0.145[4.-2].
114. See supra note 52.
115. New York followed this principle until 1972. See D. SIEGEL, HANDBOOK ON NEW YORK
PRACricEs § 28 (1978). See also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 109, at 659.
116. See generally I J. MOORE, supra note 52, at 0.145[5].
117. See infra Appendices I & II.
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The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts embodies these difficulties." 18
The Restatement begins by explaining that "a state will lack jurisdic-
tion to try a case in its courts if the advantages which trial in the state
would afford one party are greatly outweighed by the hardship and
inconvenience which would be suffered by the other."' 19 But the rela-
tionships which are defined as "sufficient to support an exercise ofjudi-
cial jurisdiction"'' 21 fail to mention these factors. The solution adopted
by the Restatement is illustrated in the first category listed as sufficient
to support jurisdiction--defendant's presence in the state. The authors
of the Restatement concede possible unreasonableness in application
but conclude that "the rule's potentialities for hardship, are mitigated
by the fact that the court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under
the rules of §§ 82-83. " 121 Sections 82 through 84 deal with fraud, force,
immunity, privilege, and forum non conveniens. The latter most
closely approximates the issues of hardship with which the Restatement
began. The authors assert, however, that the forum non conveniens
doctrine is not jurisdictional and that a judgment rendered in an incon-
venient forum is valid and must be recognized in other states under the
full faith and credit clause. 122 Thus, in their view, hardship and incon-
venience have been largely reduced to such transactional relationships
as presence and the situs of the acts. The typical long-arm statute refers
to the situs of the transaction without regard to the presence of wit-
nesses or the posture of the parties with respect to the resources for a
lawsuit. 123
Treating these issues as subject only to the discretionary doctrine of
forum non conveniens and its parallel federal transfer of venue statute
confounds the assumption that International Shoe is based on conven-
ience. This treatment also has several practical disadvantages. First, it
leaves entirely untouched those cases in which the additional burden of
out-of-state defense will encourage default, because these judgments
are not subject to later collateral attack. International Shoe, Travelers
Health, and McGee should be read as curbing the application of juris-
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
119. Id. at § 24.
120. Id. at §§ 24(2), 27-52, 105. These sections were incorporated in large part by reference in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 8 (1982).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 28 comment a (1971).
122. Id. at § 84 comment g.
123. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a) (1975); N.Y. Civ. PwAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1981).
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dictional rules to small cases in a way which encourages default. Sec-
ond, in an area of interstate conflict, a discretionary doctrine is plainly
weaker than a constitutional doctrine.
Aside from those vague and apparently sterile references to fairness
and convenience, however, International Shoe contributed little to the
exploration of why and how due process should be interpreted and
what values should be implied in the due process clause. Justice Black
refused to join the majority in International Shoe on the ground that
the rule was too amorphous and would invite significant encroachment
on the power of the states. 124 He also objected that the rule was not
well grounded in the fourteenth amendment.' 2- Black's opinions in
Traveler's Health and McGee do not appear to supply the missing links
unless they can be derived from Black's emphasis on the convenience
of litigants. Plainly, the due process values of accuracy and equality 26
are poorly served to the extent that jurisdictional rules may insulate
some parties from suit, encourage default, and undermine the presenta-
tion of the lawsuit.' 27 The preliminary question is how well grounded
in fundamental principles are those values or any of the asserted justifi-
cations for jurisdiction.
B. The Broader World of Due Process
There exist several ways of relating convenience to the broader world
of due process. Most current discussion now centers on the preferred
freedoms doctrine referred to above and on the historic relevance of
natural rights legal philosophy. Before we deal with those areas, it is
well to refer briefly to two closely related approaches.
I Fundamental and Vested Rights
Much of the development of the due process clause has taken place
in criminal contexts. One strand of this development has been a focus
on the equal protection component of due process. Under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments the courts have provided such protections as
124. 326 U.S. at 324 (Black, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 325.
126. L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at 501-06, 559-93; Mashaw, supra note 58, at 48, 52.
127. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 326-29 (1964) (Black,
J., dissenting); Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899). See generally D.
CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 204 (1974); Chase,
supra note 3, at 623-25; Special Committee on Consumer Affairs, .4 New York Consumer Law
Center, 29 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 213, 216 (1974). The problem plainly has not disappeared.
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counsel and transcripts for impoverished criminal defendants.128 Be-
cause due process also protects property, 129 judicial recognition of the
inequality of the litigants may not be limited to criminal defenfdants but
could extend to such matters as providing counsel in civil cases. 3 ' Ju-
risdictional rules, by parity of reasoning, might have to accommodate
the inequalities of civil litigants.
In criminal cases, however, the defendant's fundamental right to lib-
erty is threatened. One commentator' 3' argues that due process has
meaning as a limitation on Congress only in defense of fundamental
substantive rights; otherwise Congress could change the rules. 32 The
Court has not accepted this approach for private litigation. The Court
requires no more 3 3 and possibly less 134 than vested rights to trigger the
procedural rights of due process. Vested fights, however, have not led
the Court to compensate for the inequalities of the economic system.
The analogy to the criminal and fight-to-counsel cases is not sufficient
to carry the weight of jurisdictional doctrine. Apart from the require-
ments of a hearing 35 and a fair forum, 36 the Court has seldom been
willing to require the state to equalize the parties' resources. 137 The
Court has not been convinced that the government need take responsi-
bility for a party's lack of resources 38 so long as the government has
128. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
129. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
130. Note, The lndigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1967).
131. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in 18 NoMos: DUE PROCESS 182, 197-
202 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
132. Id. at 191.
133. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29-30 (1981); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975).
134. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process required in suit for divorce).
See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no right to predismissal hearing for
nontenured teacher but right to judicial review if reasons for dismissal infringe freedom of
speech).
135. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
136. Fairness is central to due process, see, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25
(1937); requires an impartial decisionmaker in both civil and criminal cases, Marshall v. Jerricho,
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1980); and underlies other procedural guarantees, Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223, 229-45 (1978) (six member jury required for fairness).
137. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (state required to provide indigent defendant a blood
grouping test in paternity suit).
138. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (government need not waive bankruptcy fee).
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not created the problem, 39 no fundamental rights are infringed, 140 and
there is a rational explanation for the government's policy or rule.
These conditions are satisfied in the criminal context but it is unclear
whether they are satisfied in civil contexts.
2 Governmental Power
Cutting across the major areas of due process are several significant
objectives. One of these objectives is to limit the enormity of govern-
mental power. Government must thus act reasonably even where the
interests protected are neither fundamental nor vested. t4' Government
must choose means which appropriately further a legitimate end. 42
Anything less is an arbitrary and unprincipled use of naked power. 43
In addition, there are risks that public officials may subject others to
biased or self-serving behavior. 44 It is hardly fair, however, to level
the charge of unrestrained use of governmental power at the judiciary
over the issue of jurisdiction. It is plainly useful to have rules and the
courts can hardly be accused of standardless behavior. The question is
whether the rules are fair. To comprehend that issue of fairness there
are two additional ways of considering due process which may prove
more fruitful: democratic philosophy and equal rights.
3. Democratic Philosophy
In the broader world of due process a great deal of interest is now
focused on the implications of Justice Stone's famous footnote in
139. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (filing fee must be waived for indigent plain-
tiffs seeking divorce because state permits no alternative).
140. Harper v. Virginia Board, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (no poll tax for voting permitted because
right to vote fundamental).
141. The Supreme Court has come close to legal positivism-what is required is what is en-
acted-without quite embracing it. L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at 505-06; Van Alstyne, Cracks in
"The 'New J'ropery' A djudicative Due Process in the 4dministrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
445 (1977); Grey, supra note 131, at 197-202. See J. JAMES, THE FRAMOIN OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 198 (1956).
142. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980).
143. Thus, for Stevens the "impartial method" behind the classification was crucial. Id. at 182
(Stevens, J., concurring).
144. L. TRiBE, supra note 58, at 503-04. At this level the due process and attainder clauses are
closely related. See Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: 4 Suggested Approach to the
Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE LJ. 330 (1962). See also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 44, 47, 48 (Q.
Madison) & 78 (A. Hamilton); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 A. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521.
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United States v. Carolene Products Co. ,14 which outlined the preferred
freedoms doctrine discussed above. It has become an important part of
the Court's equal protection analysis 146 and is further reflected in the
Court's incorporation of equal protection into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.147 Procedural rules are somewhat removed
from problems of insularity and malfunctions of democracy. Nonethe-
less, Stone's concern with fulfilling the promise of representative de-
mocracy has implications here as well. 14 8 In this context an argument
derived from Stone's hypothesis would begin with a courts' role as pro-
viding a check and balance and the necessity of access to courts to pro-
tect all rights. 14 9 The democrat would be concerned, on the one hand,
that procedural rules which effectively denied any group access to the
courts on reasonably even terms would so disadvantage that group as
to undermine its ability to participate in the political process and, on
the other hand, that such discrimination is the result of political isola-
tion. 150  Thus, among other things the democrat would want to know
whether the departure from truth is patterned or random and whether
it compromises the ability of a group to pursue its life, liberty, and
happiness and hold its rulers accountable. 5 '
145. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
146. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1979); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-33 (1969). See Gottlieb, Strife in the Carolene Garden, 57 U. DET.
J. URB. L. 919 (1980).
147. "[D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be a violative of due process." Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981); United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 173 n.8 (1981).
148. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED
166-67 (1975).
149. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 462-63 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 105-25, 162. See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 316 (1977); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
659, 675-79. Cf. Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town The Contributions of John Hart El, to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980) (arguing that Ely's proposal is hopelessly vague).
Tushnet's critique of Ely's theory reveals the essential ambiguity of language. There is no escape
from this critique; yet, there is no living with it either. A more significant critique may be inferred
from J. FISHKIN, TYRANNY AND LEGITIMACY (1979), arguing that no single principle can produce
just results.
151. Ely's data seems to be as consistent with the checking value, see Blasi, supra note 144, as
with a representation reinforcing model. See J. ELY, suara note 15. The representation model
looks at the republican's concern for isolating groups through an electoral prism. But there is
considerable evidence that the concern of the founding generation was more direct-what the
government itself could do. For example, Madison was most concerned that governmental tyr-
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These are high thresholds for concern but the potential for abuse of
the litigation process is systematic.152 Justice Black protested the same
pattern in a contractual consent case that he had avoided in McGee and
Traveler's Health: "The company.., doubtless hoped, by easing into
its contract this innocent-looking provision for service of process in
New York, to succeed in making it as burdensome, disadvantageous,
and expensive as possible for lessees to contest actions brought against
them.' 53
The founding fathers would not have been surprised to find insecu-
rity of property resulting in disenfranchisement. 154  The inability to
protect personal and property rights has at times made both the time
and risks of independence in politics unacceptable for those in-
volved.155 Disadvantages in the courtroom, plainly, are not random
but economically patterned. 5 6  The pattern can sometimes permit a
group to be stripped of its goods and left in fear of retribution if protest
is attempted. The founding fathers left a clear record of concern for the
anny might flow from an accurate reflection of majority sentiment. His persistent question was
how to keep majority rule from being unfair. If government action were the only problem, we
might find jurisdictional doctrine reasonable on economic grounds. In this respect, the Constitu-
tion is hardly neutral between debtors and creditors. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
A representative model, as opposed to a checking model, is a fair, though not exclusive, infer-
ence from the data. The two theories are largely consistent and the founders' words suggest em-
phasis on both themes concurrently.
152. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 127, at 191-224.
153. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 326-27 (Black, J., dissenting),
154. For example, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, in the federal convention of 1787,
stated:
Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who
will be able to buy them .... The time is not distant when this Country will abound
with mechanics and manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers
.... The man who does not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who
dictates the vote.
2 M. FARRAND, THE RacoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 202-03 (1937) (remarks of Mr.
Gouverneur Morris on August 7, 1787).
155. For a description of the political control over the mining states by the coal companies, see
H. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS 112-37 (1963).
156. It was also better than half a century from Cardozo's opinion in Altz v. Leiberson, 233
N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922), that the landlord was responsible for injuries resulting from viola-
tions of the multiple dwelling law to the time of the implication of the warranty of habitability.
Tonetti v. Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975). This gap reflects the enormous litiga-
tion disadvantages of tenants prior to the creation of the Legal Services Program in the 1960s.
The effect of disproportionate representation of clients can be traced through consumer, employ-
ment, and numerous other claims as well as tenant claims. See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, supra
note 127, at 14-25, 35-36, 42-46; Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out lhead, 3 L. & Soc. REv. 95
(1974).
[Vol. 60:1291
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/3
Number 4] SEARCH OF DUE PROCESS-JURISDICTION LINK 1317
fair resolution of public issues and due weight to the needs of whatever
minorities the future might single out.l 17 Thus, it is perfectly appropri-
ate to interpret ambiguous provisions of the Constitution in a way that
will protect those groups which may be or may have been disen-
franchised by arbitrary law enforcement.
158
This approach to due process would elevate concern for inconven-
ience but only to the extent that the disadvantages are patterned and
result in or from significant group disabilities impinging on political
self-expression. There is another way of looking at due process, how-
ever, which eliminates this threshold entirely.
4. Equal Rights
Even if there is no risk of government singling out an individual for
improper motives or fouling up the representative capacity of any
group, there is still a requirement of justice that is not satisfied by deci-
157. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (division, however, would have resulted among
those who thought that the rich or the poor were more threatened by legal institutions).
158. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT- PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 150-51, 171-78 (1962), de-
scribes the birth of the representation reinforcing theory recently revived by Ely. Michelman
suggests another avenue to this result-a right to an economic floor. Michelman, supra note 150.
Michelman admits "It]he features of nonreciprocity and potential boundlessness, which make pos-
itive rights seem problematic when considered as a priori claims that condition the workings of
institutions, are not especially troubling when rights are considered as the end results of institu-
tional deliberation and specification." Id. at 681 (emphasis in original). He urges, nevertheless,
that some floor under personal resources-food, clothing, shelter-is necessary in order for an
individual to partake of the political society.
But it is not so clear that welfare rights can be separated in this way if the objective is the
political process and participation in it. It would be difficult to establish that there is some plateau
below which one is powerless, and above which one is empowered, to deal with the system. With
regard to the cost of speech, see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976). Participatory rights must therefore be considered in relation to legislative bar-
gaining-that is, can one group buy the votes of another or can the less well off afford to express
their principle preferences? This may in fact make Michelman's point stronger--once welfare was
provided by the state the political parties were deprived of their clients and the poor were empow-
ered to choose among potential representatives. More may not be necessary under a representa-
tive model. Indeed, perfect equality of political power implies babble rather than decision.
The subjugation which denies political choice may result from economic coercion or overreach-
ing as much as from abject poverty. A contractualist model of human relationships, G. CALA-
BRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 55-64 (1970), is consistent with individual choice but models of
behavior which subject the individual to unrestrained power imply and invite a loyalty-depen-
dence model of political behavior. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 154 (statement of Gouverneur
Morris). In various forms, of course, that has happened both here and abroad.
To allow the courts to be the engine for systematically stripping any group of its property is to
consign that group to permanent powerlessness. It turns out that due process is very much at the
core of the political as well as the economic system.
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sionmaking processes (including procedural and jurisdictional rules)
unless the processes are dedicated to the establishment of truth and
accurate fact finding.'59
One of the most persistent themes in due process analysis is the relia-
bility of decisionmaking. The desire for accurate results is at the root
of the Court's cautious protections against erroneous out-of-court iden-
tification,160 its consideration of the broadcast of criminal trials,' 6' and
its notice and hearing requirements. 62 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the
Supreme Court settled on a comparison of the costs of more reliable
procedures with the improvement and benefits of reliability. 63  This
comparison may have profound effects on jurisdiction. This Article
will proceed by briefly examining the historic and philosophical under-
pinnings of the Court's conclusion that the Constitution requires a
commitment to accurate decisionmaking and then will explore the ef-
fects of that conclusion on the role of convenience.
a. The Constitutional Requirement of Accuracy
The reasons for the requirement of accurate decisionmaking are
probably best understood in terms of the founders' philosophy of law
and their notions of equality.'" The Supreme Court has given equal
protection an important place in due process. 16  The founders were
well versed in natural law, in which the inherent equality of man
played a central role.'6 6 The early republic made a considerable at-
159. In a dramatic analogy, Professors Cover and Fiss observe that while a lottery may be
acceptable for the draft, it is unacceptable for deciding who will hang for murder, though the right
to life may be involved in both instances. R. COVER & 0. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE
103 (1979). Professor Ann K. McConnell was kind enough to discuss with me at great length the
Lockean approach to law and this section of this paper has benefitted enormously from her
assistance.
160. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 350-53 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574-83 (1981).
162. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537-39 (1981); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264, 266-
71 (1970).
163. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (risk of error in cases involving termination of parental rights); Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (risk of error reduced by blood grouping test in paternity proceedings),
But Sf. Mashaw, supra note 58 (arguing that reliability ought to be only one factor among several).
164. Mashaw, supra note 58, at 48-49.
165. See supra note 147.
166. The Declaration of Independence proclaimed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident:
that all men are created equal." R. COVER, supra note 148, at 8-28; L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at 539
n.5.
The significance of the free and equal and inalienable right to liberty clauses of the Declaration
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tempt to democratize the litigation process, setting low attorney fees
and court costs. 67 Lawyers were often denounced for imparting une-
qual justice.' 68 The country was limited by resources and technique
but not by desire to equalize the litigation process among litigants.
The meaning of equal protection and due process has developed dur-
ing the course of current interest in the natural law philosophy imbibed
by the founding generation. 169 While natural law has been extensively
criticized as indeterminate, 7 ° it is firmly grounded in equality which
yields leverage. Equality is fundamental to natural law in the sense
that the edifice of natural law is built upon the assumption of equal-
ity.' 7 ' This notion of equality, however, is not the class difference no-
tion we have become most accustomed to in the context of the
fourteenth amendment. In its historic context, shaped by the belief in
natural and universal law, equality turned on the notion of
exploitation. 172
To illustrate, if controversies were resolved by merely ffipping a
coin, it could be anticipated that the decisions would be wrong fifty
percent of the time. This mechanism is very cheap. Presumably, im-
proving reliability is costly and the cost would deplete the sum avail-
able for the award. Thus, more accurate procedures may not be a
of Independence and several state constitutions was a subject of disagreement in the early repub-
lic. Generally, these clauses were read in light of the intentions involved in their adoptions but the
contradiction between slavery and natural law was clearly felt. Vermontjoined the free and equal
clause with emancipation in its Constitution. R. COVER, supra note 148, at 43. Massachusetts
interpreted its clause to require emancipation. Id. at 47-48. In Virginia, George Wythe construed
the clause as establishing a presumption of freedom. His reasoning, but not his result-freeing a
family of Indians-was overturned on appeal on the ground that Virginia had not intended to free
blacks under this clause. But the judge who wrote the opinion construed natural law as doing just
that! Id. at 38, 51-55. New Jersey, several decades later, read its free and equal clause as "but a
preamble." Id. at 57 (Randolph, J., concurring, but expressing well the sense of the majority
view). The reading of natural law proposed here elevates the principles over the specific intent of
the founding generation.
167. Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie, 20 VAND. L. RE. 1216,
1218-21 (1967).
168. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 82-84, 265-66 (1973).
169. R. DWORKIN, TAING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971).
170. See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 48-54.
171. See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident: that all men are created equal .. "). See also R. DWORKIN, supra note 169, at 177-
83, 223-39; J. LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 4-6 (Peardon ed. 1952); J. RAWLS,
supra note 169, at 60-65, 504-12.
172. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 73 (1977).
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utilitarian solution since the total available to the parties would be de-
creased.'7 3 The rightful owner, however, may be able to trade the costs
of a fairer procedure to improve his chances-any gambler will confirm
that an eighty percent chance of an eighty dollar purse is worth more to
the bettor than a fifty percent chance at a hundred dollar purse. To
gamble with one's property is cheaper but exploitive-one party stands
to gain without justification. This result contradicts the equality of
mankind as natural lawyers, past and present, would have understood
it because it devalues the rights of one party and exaggerates the claims
of the other.'74 In other words, exploitation exists if the misallocation
as a result of wrong judgments is greater than the cost of procedures
which would correct it.
If the cost of fairer procedures is greater than the misallocation of
resources then it is impossible to eliminate the improper loss. To in-
crease the procedural costs beyond the size of the misallocation im-
poses a cost on someone which cannot be balanced against an
appropriate award. It is an unjustified cost.
There may of course be litigants who are frequently involved in the
courts and for whom the odds "balance out." The odds, however, only
balance if we assume that the odds of being right equal the odds of
winning. More likely, for reasons discussed below, litigants frequently
involved in the judicial process will have better odds of winning. This
magnifies the problem to the extent that the risk of error does not fall
evenly, particularly if the beneficiaries of an uneven risk can be identi-
fied. In that instance the unequal treatment of the parties is much more
glaring. 175
173. Accurate though expensive proceedings may prove utilitarian if feelings of dissatisfaction
or the prospect of discouraging fraudulent claims are taken into account.
174. That is of course the point at which natural-law philosophy becomes open-ended; it de-
pends, for its content, on independently created rights. But that corresponds perfectly with the
functions of a procedural system.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 178-83. Caution is necessary to the extent that this
approach is deceptive in its apparent precision. Comparing procedural costs with misallocations
to be avoided is difficult even when we confine ourselves to things that can be measured in dollars.
But dollars and dignity cannot be converted into each other, Lawyers generally do not have the
capacity to obtain precise results from multifactorial analysis.
Lawyers resort to generalized balancing to prioritization, or to precedent and analogy. Thus, if
there are competing due process values involved, no standard can yield a determinate result.
Lawyers can hope to be persuasive but not conclusive. This is true, however, of all approaches to
due process and most theories of law.
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b. Convenience and Accuracy
If jurisdictional rules encourage default, discourage suit, or imbal-
ance the presentation of issues, the probability of exploitation rather
than accurate-let alone evenhanded-decisionmaking is great. 176
From the perspective of accurate decisionmaking the questions arise
whether the inconveniences of litigation resulting from jurisdictional
rules affect the results, whether the increase in the risk of error is large,
and whether the costs of improving the judicial process are commensu-
rate with the misallocation.
III. DOES CONVENIENCE MATTER?
To understand the significance of rules of jurisdiction under the con-
stitutional standards we have been exploring, it is necessary to explore
how rules of jurisdiction interact with litigation practices.1 77 This is not
176. Some argue, however, that default yields considerable judicial economy and everybody is
better off with a cheaper system. If everyone is better off then there is no exploitation-we would
all choose the system if we could. The argument takes the form that it is better for you if we
decide and implies disproportionate process costs because allowing plaintiff to make a largely
unreviewable decision is cheaper. This argument, however, can generally be rejected. For exam-
ple, in the consumer area creditors might argue that they can and will offer credit at lower rates if
they can collect more easily. First, this is a question of fact and it is not at all plain that if a group
is protected from judicial scrutiny it will not act like a monopolist, raking in larger profits rather
than passing along any favors. Many firms that regularly resort to the courts to collect from their
customers may have engaged in various forms of deception to sell to otherwise unwilling buyers.
D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 127, at 37-46, 92-125. Second, such a rule permits systematic abuse.
There are substantial costs associated with permitting such a system to develop. See supra note
156 (discussion of Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922)). Third, a policy restricting
access through general procedural rules applies both to cases where such an argument might be
made and where it might not. Each of these three arguments suggests that the position "it's better
for you if I decide" should usually be rejected as too self-serving and untrustworthy. See J. ELY,
supra note 15, at 158-61. There may be exceptions where knowledge is widely disseminated and
where, with penalties heavy, some checks on unfairness of unilateral deliberate decisionmaking
are available. Generally, however, there is no reason to expect unilateral decisions to be accurate
or decisions insulated from review to be fair. But from the natural-law perspective there is a more
fundamental reason. Why should any one person bear the burden of that general advantage for
all debtors or others who are denied access to the courts? This turns out then to be a corollary of
our general position. If the risk can be equalized or reduced without burdens disproportionate to
the misallocation then the risk should be equalized.
177. Identifying these fundamental strands of due process does not solve the problem of ratio-
nalizing jurisdictional doctrine-it only poses it. These strands of interpretation may conflict with
as well as support one another. The political freedom and equal rights perspectives do converge
in their emphasis on the accuracy of decisions and on substantive justice to the parties. They
focus our attention on the relationship between jurisdictional rules and the outcome of litigation.
Nevertheless, they can conflict. Where a pattern of victimization develops the argument from
democratic principles requires relief. The equal rights perspective may accord with the demo-
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the same inquiry as that undertaken by the Court under current stan-
dards. This Article will illustrate the implications of the views of the
Court in earlier cases, the Court's acceptance of the preferred freedoms
theory in some circumstances, and the work of recent scholars explor-
ing the impact of the founders' understanding of the natural equality of
mankind on constitutional provisions.
In cases in which the sums at issue are much larger than the cost of
litigation, the parties and counsel find it worthwhile to make considera-
ble efforts to foot the bill. It is less likely that even the extra problems
of defense in a distant jurisdiction will significantly affect the results to
the extent that suits involve increasingly substantial sums. Counsel
place more emphasis on considerations of choice of law and the lar-
gesse of juries than they do on considerations of expense in major liti-
gation. Concomitantly, convenience is less significant in these cases as
a basis for jurisdiction than conflicts principles and the legitimacy of
submission of the dispute to the standards of particular communities.
As the sums at issue decline, jurisdictional rules aggravate the diffi-
culty of financing litigation.' 78 Litigation in distant jurisdictions often
requires additional expenses-additional sets of lawyers, travel, search,
and management costs.
The classic statement of the relevant inequalities among parties is by
Professor Marc Galanter. Galanter differentiates between repeaters
and one-shotters---those who are involved in repeated litigation and
those who are not.179  Galanter describes a number of advantages
which flow from frequent participation in litigation. 80 Among these,
cratic perspective but it is impotent to deal with small claims. When process costs exceed inequi-
ties, the equal rights perspective might bar demanding greater expenditure on process at least by
the erstwhile beneficiary. Thus, the two approaches may conflict. They can be harmonized either
by treating the requirement of democratic participation as superior or by treating the equal rights
perspective as inconclusive in the situation of high process costs by virtue of a possible stronger
requirement of equality, for example, Rawis' "difference principle," or by virtue of the generation
of democratic principles from equal rights principles.
178. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (class action developed
in partial recognition of this problem).
179. Galanter defines these concepts briefly and inexactly: "We might divide our actors into
those claimants who have only occasional recourse to the courts (one-shotters or OS) and repeat
players (RP) who are engaged in many similar litigations over time." Galanter, supra note 156, at
97.
180.
(1) [the ability] to structure the next transaction and build a record ....
(2) expertise... ready access to specialists.. . economies of scale and.., low start-
up costs for any case.
[Vol. 60:1291
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frequent litigators can play the odds for better judgments and play for
long term advantages, while infrequent litigators are often forced to
minimize the possibility of substantial loss. These disadvantages are
magnified by the extra expense of distant litigation and impose a sub-
stantial barrier to the initial decision to sue or defend. The difference
in start-up costs, also identified by Galanter, are magnified by distance.
Frequent litigators have greater opportunities to develop helpful infor-
mal relationships with experts, lawyers, judges, and others involved.
These relationships are also aggravated by distance.
As Justice Black observed in National Equipment Rental Co. v. Szuk-
bent, the results can be outrageous.18  Black concluded that the cost of
the Szukhent's litigation would "probably crippl[e] their defense and
certainly deplet[e] what savings they may have. .. ."I" He saw in
these issues more than an accident, but a systematic effort by the plain-
tiff to take advantage of those circumstances which would prejudice the
defendants' ability to contest the litigation.13  It is easier, however, to
state the problem of inconvenience than to correct it.
Jurisdictional rules alter the outlook at three stages. First, jurisdic-
tional rules affect the decision to consult an attorney. The apparent
need to find counsel elsewhere may encourage some parties to default
or to give up either on the mistaken assumption that what is done so far
(3) opportunities to develop facilitative informal relationships with institutional
incumbents.
(4) [a] bargaining reputation ...
(5) RPs can play the odds. The larger the matter. . . the more likely. . . [an OS will]
minimize the probability of maximum loss.. .[while RPs] can maximize gain over a
large series of cases ....
(6) it pays an RP to ... lobby[].
(7) RPs can also play for rules in litigation itself...
(8) RPs may be able to concentrate their resources on rule changes that are likely to
make a tangible difference....
(9) RPs are more likely to be able to invest the. . . resources necessary ...
Id. at 98-103.
181. 375 U.S. 311, 326 (1964). Justice Black stated:
It is hardly likely that these Michigan farmers, hiring farm equipment, were in any posi-
tion to dicker over what terms went into the contract they signed. Yet holding this serv-
ice effective inevitably will mean that the Szukhents must go nearly a thousand miles to a
strange city, hire New York counsel, pay witnesses to travel there, pay their own and
their witnesses' hotel bills, try to explain a dispute over a farm equipment lease to a New
York judge or jury, and in other ways bear the burdens of litigation in a distant, and
likely a strange, city.
Id.
182. Id. at 329.
183. Id. at 326-27.
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away cannot hurt, by magnifying the reluctance to consult counsel or
because of a realistic expectation of the extra expense involved.
Second, the decision to litigate is affected by rules of jurisdiction.
These'problems are not insurmountable for lawyers. The almost uni-
versal requirement of local counsel18 4 precludes direct response by at-
torneys in the client's community. Interstate referrals are not, of
course, always satisfactory but neither are they difficult or unfamiliar.
The distance will, however, add to the cost.' -
Finally, jurisdictional rules alter the conduct of the litigation itself.
Not only may distant counsel prove less responsive, but the expense
can drain funds which might be better used for other purposes. There
is little reason to assume that parties are equally situated with respect to
the handling of interstate legal business.'8 6
184. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979); Note, The Practice of Law by Out-of-Slate Attorneys,
20 VAND. L. REV. 1276 (1967). The barriers to multiple admissions by individual counsel may be
declining. See In re Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
185. In addition to travel, the custom among lawyers has been for the receiving attorney to
forward one-third of the fee to the referring lawyer. McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar
of Stated Professional Standards, 51 VA. L. REv. 399, 415-17 (1951); The Determination ofProfes-
sional Feesfrom the Ethical Viewpoint-4 Panel Discussion, 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 433 (1954); Com-
ment, Division ofFees Between Attorneys, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 179, 184-85, 188-92 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Division]; Comment, Fee Spltting--Finder's Fee-Effect ofMissouri Supreme Court Rule
4.34, 24 Mo. L. REv. 557, 558 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Fee Splitting].
One author argues that there is no evidence that this cost is passed on to the clients in higher
prices or poorer services. See Division, supra, at 194-96. Intuitively this does not make sense and
the evidence appears to contradict it. See F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERV-
ices 180-81 (1967). Any diminution of the anticipated rate of return to the laboring attorney
would be likely to reduce the result. See Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis ofthe Con-
tingent Fee in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1125 (1970). See also Steirett, The Sale
of a Law Practice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 306, 314 (1972); Fee Splitting, supra, at 560.
These expenses are now being altered by the growth of interstate, and international, corporate
firms and legal clinics. See Cantor, Managing Legal Organization in the 1980's, 11 U. TOL, L.R.
311, 316-17 (1980). To a certain degree the bar has always been able to respond to changes in
jurisdictional rules by alterations in its structure and practices but within limits and with some lag.
Thus, for example, auto clubs have tried to compensate for the unavailability of counsel in small
cases only to be attacked for unauthorized practice. Bulleit, Automobile Clubs and the Courts, 5
LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 22 (1938); Collins, Automobile Club Activities: The Problem from the
Standpoint ofthe Clubs, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 3 (1938); Leviton, Automobile Club Activities:"
The Problem from the Standpoint ofthe Bar, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (1938).
186. There may be additional difficulties where one party asserts a protected freedom because
the costs of litigation may function as an a priori limitation on that freedom. See Schauer, Fear,
Risk and The First Amendment: Unraveling The "Chilling Effect" 58 B.U.L. REv. 685, 712 (1978).
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A. Conduct of the Litigation
When the client is located at a distance from the attorney's commu-
nity, the responsiveness, effectiveness, and promptness of counsel1 87
will often be affected because few clients will be in a position to recom-
mend the attorney to others or to employ the attorney on other matters.
Independent of the costs of working through distant counsel, there is a
separate expense to bring witnesses to the place of trial. When overall
expense is in issue, defendants can and do present this to the court on
motions for a change of venue.
In assessing the convenience of plaintiffs choice of forum, courts fo-
cus on the difficulties of investigation, trial and relief.1 88 Under the
transfer of venue statute'89 the judge is empowered to consider the re-
sources of the parties, the convenience of witnesses, and the expense of
trial, 9° though no clear priorities among these considerations have
emerged.' 9' An important justification for minimizing expense is that
the cost of suit can place the risk of error on the weaker party.1 92 Thus,
187. See the material collected in G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 35-
123 (1978). Counsel will also be less willing to finance these extra expenses in smaller litigation.
In doing so, counsel may be perfectly rational; although the Code of Professional Responsibility is
not so charitable toward attorneys who accept litigation only to handle it lackadaisically. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-31, DR 2-110, DR 6-101(A)(3) (1979).
The results, however, may not be economic: first, because it permits systematic effects beyond the
individual cases counsel may leave stranded, and second, because the results are not merely the
result of efficient resource allocations but rather result from inequalities in legal rights-what
government has given it can also transfer with equal or better grace. See G. CALABRESI, supra
note 158, at 86-88 (discussion of the theory of the second best); Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note
185, at 1125 (on the contingent fees).
188. The Supreme Court stated:
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained.
Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 502, 508 (1947). See also Golconda Mining Corp. v. Herlands,
365 F.2d 856, 857 (2d Cir. 1966) (comparing plaintiffs' witnesses with defendants' witnesses);
Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1966); 1 J. MooRE, supra note 52,
at 0.14515].
189. See supra note 110.
190. 1 J. MOORE, supra note 52, at 0.14515].
191. 1 J. MOOREsupra note 52, at 0.145[5]; 15 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE & PROCEDURE § 3847 (1970).
192. See Griswold, The Legal Profession in the 1980s, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 193, 198, 199 (1980);
Janofsky, The Future of the Legal Profession and the American Bar Association, 11 U. TOL. L. REv.
201, 206, 207 (1980); Millstone, Cruel Justice From the Consumer's Viewpoint, in COMM'N ON A
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, QUEST FOR JUSTICE 68, 73, 74 (1973); Prendergast & Whittington, Auto-
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if the 6xpense of transporting witnesses is a problem, federal transfer
and state common-law doctrines may be adequate.
If the expenses of trial which are appropriate to a motion for a
change of venue are what the Court in International Shoe referred to as
convenience, however, it could hardly explain the right of collateral
attack which has followed jurisdictional errors and which seems unnec-
essary. Conversely, if convenience is related to due process, the Court's
failure to constitutionalize transfer and forum non convenience doc-
trine is difficult to explain.
B. Pleading
The impetus for default or for failure to litigate was the issue Justice
Black raised in Traveler's Health 19 3 and McGee.'9 4 It is a special case,
but not a rare one, where the sums at stake do not warrant the expense
of distant litigation. Both the cost of counsel and the cost of travel to
make a per se appearance may be prohibitive. 9 5 Only in this situation
and in the prejudiced forum situation do the need for collateral attack
and the doctrinal underpinnings of due process point toward the exten-
sive protection now afforded by jurisdictional rules. Misuse of either
jurisdiction or venue works most effectively if defendants default. One
frequent abuser of venue rules admitted that it routinely dismissed ac-
tions where the defendant appeared and objected. 96 Ironically, though
the courts and the FTC have recognized the problem, 197 they have re-
fused to treat it as jurisdictional. Instead they have awarded only pro-
spective relief, denied collateral attack, and treated inconvenience as a
discretionary matter under venue rules rather than an obligatory juris-
dictional matter. 198
matedLitigation Support Systemsfor Evidentiary Management, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 255 (1980). See
also Posner, An Economic .4pproach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEo.
STUDIEs 399, 435-37 (1973) (estimating the effects of efforts to reduce costs on the expense of
litigation).
193. See supra note 82.
194. See supra note 83.
195. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1976); Barquis v. Merchants
Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 105-06,496 P.2d 817, 825, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 753 (1972) (en banc).
196. Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1976).
197. Id. See Shubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 376 N.E.2d 140 (Mass. 1978).
198. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 118-19, 496 P.2d 817, 835, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 745, 763 (1972) (en banc). See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1976)
(expressing inability to determine the jurisdictional issue generically); id. at 294-97 (narrowing the
reach of the FTC order).
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It is at the pleading stage that the differences between plaintiffs and
defendants are most stark. The plaintiffs decision to litigate is done
within his own time frame and his knowledge of jurisdictional
problems probably arises only after consulting counsel-the same mo-
ment, of course, when counsel also can explain and deal with the need
to obtain local counsel elsewhere if necessary. Resources may prove
difficult, but ignorance as a barrier to relief for the plaintiff should not
be magnified by jurisdictional doctrine.
For the defendant, however, the time frame is shorter and the diffi-
culty of defending in a distant forum must be apparent before counsel
is consulted. Thus, one can anticipate that long-arm jurisdiction will
pose particular problems for one-shot defendants, particularly in small
cases.
These problems can be significant. The added costs of out-of-state
litigation may make defense or prosecution uneconomical. Data which
would indicate the extent of the problem, however, is not available.199
Studies of parties in default are consistent with the hypothesis we have
been considering but they are not conclusive. 2° If convenience is a
factor in jurisdictional decisions it should show up in the use of collat-
eral attack. Although our sample was small, the results are striking.2 0 1
In small cases the extra cost of directly attacking jurisdiction in distant
forums does not seem to justify the effort to the litigants.
C. A Summary on Convenience
The inconvenience of jurisdiction can greatly affect the results in
ways inadequately handled by venue or other rules. The contacts test
first focused on inconvenience, as developed in International Shoe and
was later amplified in Traveler's Health and McGee. By contrast, the
contacts test, as understood since Hanson and now amplified by World-
Wide Volkswagen, focuses on matters having nothing to do with the
litigation.
IV. Is JURISDICTIONAL JUSTICE POSSIBLE?
Convenience matters but it points in divergent directions: defendant
199. The FTC and the Seventh Circuit have, however, concluded that the problem is serious,
see Spiegel, 540 F.2d at 291, 294.
200. See infra Appendix I.
201. See infra Appendix II. My thanks goes to Linda Olfield, my research assistant, for com-
pleting the sample and putting together Charts III through IV.
Number 4] 1327
Washington University Open Scholarship
1328 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
bias at the pleading stage to avoid default; proof bias at the trial stage
to reduce costs. There are three options beyond the current rules: to
fashion a test based on the sums involved, the parties involved, or the
type of suit.
A. Dollars
Black's treatment of convenience in Traveler's Health20 2 and Mc-
Gee2"3 could be interpreted to focus directly on the size of the lawsuit
and to deny long-arm jurisdiction where the amount in issue is too
small to justify the expense of making a defenses. In cases involving
large sums of money, convenience of trial ought to be the ruling consid-
eration on both state and federal levels. One potential problem is that
the plaintiff could manipulate the complaint to obtain jurisdiction, as in
federal diversity cases subject to the ten thousand dollar limitation.
That limitation is partly met by a cost penalty under title 28, section
1332(b) of the United States Code. It might, however, be more effec-
tively met by a special attorney's fees rule.2°4 This proposal, however,
does not seem to help Mrs. McGee because it does not solve the prob-
lem of determining what type of small case should be in whose jurisdic-
tion. If a general defendant bias is preferable for the reasons outlined
above, Mrs. McGee would have to sue in Texas on that ground.
B. Parties
Alternatively Mrs. McGee could claim that she has special needs or
lacks resources to litigate elsewhere. This is another interpretation of
Black's development of the convenience idea.205 In turn, there are sev-
eral choices for accomplishing this.
Mrs. McGee could argue that the other party can afford litigation in
Mrs. McGee's forum but that she cannot afford it in her opponent's
forum. It is customary to assert that decisions based on wealth or re-
sources are improper 0 6 in part because of their substantive irrele-
202. See supra note 82.
203. See supra note 83.
204. See, eg., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (1962).
205. See supra notes 82 & 83.
206. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (lack of effective
redress absent class action); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, at 239 (1940)
("Of course, appeals to passion and prejudice may so poison the minds ofjurors even in a strong
case that an accused may be deprived of a fair trial"); Allison v. Acton-Etheridge Coal Co., 268
[Vol. 60:1291
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vance,207 and in part because of the possibility of abuse of the deep
pocket.2"8 By hypothesis, reducing the risk of error requires action, but
the risks of overusing the deep pocket are substantial. These risks are
less significant in unique litigation than in repetitive litigation, with its
commensurably greater demands on the depth of the pocket.
On the other hand, Mrs. McGee could claim that she is a one-shotter
facing a repeat player and it is fair to make the repeater come to her.209
This course theatens the resources of the deep pocket. It might also
invite significant problems of proof if this standard were uniformly
required.210
So.2d 725 (Ala. 1972) ("any reference to wealth or economic condition of a party by opposing
counsel is invidious and prejudicial. .. ").
207. "An appeal attempting to excite prejudice against a party because of that party's wealth
or bigness, thereby attempting to draw the minds of the jury away from the matter in dispute, is
improper argument." Montgomery-Ward & Co. v. Wooley, 121 Ind. App. 60, 94 N.E.2d 677
(1950).
208. "[Jurors have a tendency to favor the poor as against the rich, and if provoked by...
argument, are likely to apply the 'deep pocket' theory of liability, or to adjust the size of the
verdict to the financial ability of the party who is to pay it." Annot., 32 A.L.R. 2d 9, 17 (1953). On
the other hand, antitrust laws and rules restricting contracts of adhesion come close to that
distinction.
209. Galanter's broad definitions leave room for improvement. One approach might focus on
the quantity of litigation or of similar cases, or the presence of a retainer agreement covering the
kind of suit involved, or the presence of attorneys, agents or correspondents for collection, or other
legal business outside of their home district. Quantitative cutoffs could be provided by legislation.
It might be enough to assert jurisdiction in the forum if the defendant has ever sued or defended
in the forum jurisdiction and it is essential to group parties who are responsible for the judgment
or the defense and whose interest vis-a-vis the litigation are identical. Plainly, insurance compa-
nies are a prime example. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
210. It can be very difficult to determine who needs what accommodation in order to equalize
the risk of error. This focus on the parties thus poses dangers stemming from problems of proof.
The issue of litigation involvement necessary to determine repeater status is not well-marked in
most states in centralized documents, except for the publication of appellate decisions. Captions
can be camouflaged despite requirements that litigation be conducted in the name of the real party
in interest. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). This could force county-by-county record searches in each of
several courts. Efforts by repeaters to restructure the litigation or the transaction to avoid repeater
status might have prohibitive costs, but two avenues are possible and both create substantial
problems of proof. First, claims are generally assignable, J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER,
NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTIcE § 1004.14 (1982), though prohibitions on assignment to collection
agencies complicate this ruse. N.Y. JUD. L. § 489 (McKinney 1968). Second, the original transac-
tion might be restructured through agents or other parties. This is difficult when volumes are
large, but litigation is often managed and financed by an insurer who is not named. This may
present relatively few problems in ordinary traffic accident cases because of compulsory insurance.
But in other areas it could generate a costly look behind the litigation. The additional threat of
diverting resources from litigation to private enforcement always exists. Leff, Injury, Ignorance
and Spite: The Dyamicr of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 5-18 (1970).
These problems generate three types of risks of error. If one-shotters were given the option of
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Alternatively, Mrs. McGee could borrow an idea from Calabresi2t t
and Justice Marshall2 12 and claim that the defendants can spread the
costs. Calabresi argues that a major focus of the law is and should be
on identification of those parties who can best spread the loss (cost-
spreaders), so that it is not too catastrophic for any one party or on
those parties that can best avoid the problem in the first place (cost-
avoiders). An example of a good cost-avoider is the workmen's com-
pensation employer.1 3 It is easier for the employer to plan for safety
than it is for each employee to do so. Hence, placing the legal liability
and entire cost of the accident on the employer without fault generates
a more efficient solution to the safety problem. Cost-spreaders, on the
other hand, are best exemplified by insurance companies. Justice Mar-
shall employed this idea regarding attorney's fees. He suggested that
the costs of counsel be shifted only if they could be passed on to the
employing long-arm jurisdiction subject only to contacts and sovereignty considerations, repeaters
in one-shot garb might obtain long-arm jurisdiction when they should not. This risk exists under
present law. Jurisdiction is not infrequently premised on relatively slight contact. See Wisconsin
Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1980); D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE § 86 (1978). This analysis applies to parties of all descriptions, not merely to the corpo-
rate defendants for which International Shoe was originally fashioned. See 4 C. WRIOT & A.
MILLER, supra note 191, at § 1069. On the other hand, if long-arm jurisdiction were permitted
only against repeaters some would evade jurisdiction. This would cut back on present plaintiff
options. Because insurance companies defending tort actions are clearly repeaters, narrowing
long-arm jurisdiction to repeater defendants need work no change in the availability of the long
arm in accident cases. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), restricted reliance on insurer de-
fendants for jurisdictional purposes but direct-action statutes could plainly retake this ground.
Finally, there is the risk of considerable litigation. There has been considerable litigation on the
issue of doing business. Some of the information necessary to raise this issue, however, is present
in the claim and therefore within plaintiffs knowledge. When it is not, plaintiffs now resort to
publicly or privately maintained records that are widely available through numerous commercial
services. Though the initial leads may be more difficult to come by, proof of repeated litigation
may be easier to make than of the extent of business dealings. Repeaters may be expected to use
their litigation advantages in this area as they doin others but their efforts may be mitigated by
application of collateral estoppel and the precision of state laws. Collateral estoppel would have
been prevented by the rule of mutuality of estoppel. Rut see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 327-28 (1979); M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 245-53 (2d ed. 1979). Private serv-
ice agencies could centralize and simplify data collection. Litigation could be discouraged by
charging the cost of attorneys' of the rule optional and eliminating the temptation to litigate the
obvious by requiring a dual demonstration of the party's own lack of resources and its opponent's
frequent access to the courts.
211. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 158, at 47-50, 60-64.
212. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 272 (1975) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
213. See G. CALABREsI, supra note 158, at 135-40, 175, 245-46.
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ultimate beneficiaries.' 1 4 In A~eska Pipeline he believed the pipeline
company could pass the costs of such an award through its prices to the
public which presumably benefited. a 5
Cost-avoiders may not be easily discovered in the procedural con-
text. First, identifying the cost-avoider requires prejudging the litiga-
tion. Second, it seems likely that many of those who are in a position to
restructure the transaction in order to minimize the likelihood of a dis-
pute will be small businesses poorly equipped to finance distant litiga-
tion. Identifying cost-spreaders might be more appropriate. If a cost-
spreader is identified by position in the chain of distribution-such as
employers in the workmen's compensation example-it is consistent
with the existence of scant litigation resources. If cost-spreaders are
identified by their resources it implies a means test with the problems
of abusing the deep pocket.216
The idea of the cost-spreader works, however, if that party can actu-
ally pass the costs along. There are two possibilities. One is the case of
the monopolist. The other is the case of an industry in which one type
of suit is sufficiently common that the litigation reflects a cost of doing
business for the industry rather than an isolated expense. In other
words, a true cost-spreader in a competitive industry is likely to be a
repeater with respect to one type of litigation.
This analysis suggests that in cases of unusual variety where small
sums are at stake, a party without resources may argue that the burden
of distant litigation be shifted to the party with greater resources. This
analysis further suggests that in small cases of common variety a party
may argue that the burden be shifted in the event that the other party is
a repeater or cost-spreader with respect to the type of litigation
involved.
A final approach to Mrs. McGee's problem is to allow her to claim
that the defendant does a substantial volume of interstate business
while Mrs. McGee does not. A substantial volume of interstate busi-
ness may correlate highly both with sufficient resources to finance dis-
tant litigation and with the ability to spread the cost. In addition, this
approach focuses on the familiarity a litigant may need to have with
distant locales to defend or prosecute effectively. In the event that both
214. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 288 (1975) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 206-08.
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the plaintiff and the defendant do a substantial volume of interstate
business, ease of trial should control. In the event that one party sub-
stantially engages in interstate business and the other does not, trial
should be commenced in the jurisdiction of the party who is not sub-
stantially involved in interstate commerce. In the event that neither
does a substantial volume of interstate business, the court may look at
either the means or the ability to spread the cost of litigation as above.
These alternatives, singly or in combination, could rationalize the
problem of jurisdiction in small cases between unequal parties.
Whether the patterns are sufficiently predictable to avoid individual-
ized litigation altogether needs further consideration.
C Case Patterns
The costs of investigating litigant status may be the best argument
for more general rules. 217 While Galanter's categories 218 may not work
well when applied directly, they may work better as a basis for statu-
tory categorization by type of suit based on all the patterns of litigation.
In some cases a focus on convenience will yield results similar to the
focus on intent required by Hanson21 9 and World- Wide Volkswagen.22°
In some car accident cases, litigation is conducted between insurance
companies for both sides and there is little reason to suspect significant
inequalities between the litigants. Insurance companies can and do sue
and defend nationally, a fact now recognized in many statutes.22' Pre-
sumably, the added cost of extraterritorial litigation is tacked on to the
217. See supra note 210.
218. See supra text accompanying note 179.
219. See supra note 20.
220. See supra note 2.
221. ALA. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a)(2)(F); ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-
2502 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (1974 & Supp.
1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13A23 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West 1969 & Supp. 111980);
IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (1979); IND. CODE § 35-5-1-1 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp.
1982-83); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (1979 & Supp. 1981-82); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210
(Baldwin 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (1964); MD. CTS. & JJD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 6-103 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A § 3 (Michie/Law Coop. Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.705 (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.500 (Vernon Supp. 1981-82); MONT. CODE ANN.
tit. 25, ch. 20, R.C.P. 4B (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25.536 (1977); NEv. REv. STAT. § 14.065
(1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1969 & Supp. 1981); N.D.
R. Civ. P. 46 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.38.1-.2 (Baldwin 1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 14.030 (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5322 (Purdon 1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-270 (Law Co-op 1976); S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 15-7-2 (1967 & Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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rates and spread among the subscribers.222 As a result of repeated liti-
gation, insurance companies have the advantage of continuing relation-
ships with designated attorneys who are and expect to be judged by
their track record. This experience of working together simplifies the
problems of communications between lawyer and client.223 In these
instances there is seldom a strain either on the parties or on the mini-
mum contacts required in bringing court and witnesses together.
In cases in which the plaintiff seeks damages beyond the limits of his
own first party coverage, which includes injuries to many drivers, pas-
sengers and most pedestrians, the plaintiff is what Galanter refers to as
a one-shotter. Long-arm statutes give those litigants an advantage in
forcing jurisdiction at plaintiff's home if the accident took place there.
Witnesses, contacts, and resources may all be found in the plaintiffs
forum.
In contracts cases, whether witnesses, contacts and resources mesh
well depends on the nature of claims and defenses. The existence of
credit agencies and collection agencies often eases the burden of distant
litigation which makes it much easier for the plaintiff to sue abroad
than for the defendant to defend abroad. The central advantage of the
credit and collection agencies is the volume of business forwarded. The
agencies identify appropriate counsel in each community.224 By focus-
ing and organizing the credit and collection business, the agencies give
their clients an advantage that the one-shot plaintiff does not get from
§ 4.28,185 (West 1962 & Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (1966 & Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 801.05 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982-83).
222. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 158, at 47-50, 60-64.
223. Corporate law departments also face special costs for interstate business, including the
maintenance of lists of eligible attorneys where the corporation does business and investigation of
local firms prior to and in anticipation of litigation. Pollack, Corporate Law Department Rendering
Quality Services, 51 N.Y.S. B.J. 632, 660 (1979). The cost of keeping information may be negligi-
ble. The cost of finding local counsel may require two hours' work by home office counsel, largely
on the telephone seeking recommendations-a task simplified by the large network of attorneys
with whom large corporations deal. The telephone charges, not large in themselves, are likely
rendered even snialler by the use of microwave long distance services. More significant is the cost
of initial briefing. Corporate clients prefer to meet counsel in person both to set up a personal
relationship and to facilitate mutual understanding of the goals and problems of the litigation.
The cost of travel at the start of litigation can be significant. (The author wishes to acknowledge a
debt to Ernest Walton, an attorney with a large American corporation who explained his practices
at some length in regard to handling out-of-state litigation.)
224. Schiffer, The Collection Agency--An Economic Necessity, 74 COMM. L.J. 119, 120 (1969);
Operative Guides for Forwarders and Receivers Adopted by the Commercial Law League of
America, 80 COMM. L.J. 487, 488 2.1 (1975).
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the structure of private litigation. Nor does the emergence of multistate
firms promise much for the ordinary one-shotter because these firms
usually concentrate on corporate law. Thus, in some consumer, war-
ranty, and product liability cases, witnesses, resources, and contacts
may mesh. "Purposeful availment" of state protection sometimes
works well under modem conditions-perhaps because of the rules-
where the active party is often more able to bear the costs of distant
litigation and the burden is placed on that party, for example, mail
order houses and tort defendants. The correlation easily breaks down,
however, for persons such as travelers and small businessmen. In a
small group of cases it has also proven possible to mesh convenience
factors by requiring that a defendant requesting transfer pay the addi-
tional expenses of a plaintiff resisting transfer.225
There are other more difficult cases in which the factors of will and
convenience diverge; for example, those involving victims of distant ac-
cidents226 or some consumer litigants.227 On occasion, courts have en-
deavored to distinguish individual from corporate litigants228 and more
active purchasers from mail order buyers.229 Like McGee230 and Trap-
eler's Health ,23 ' however, these courts made their decisions in terms of
contacts and have spawned no general classification of litigants. Mini-
mizing the risk of cost-induced default and reducing the cost of trial
may also conflict in these cases.
V. THE IRRELEVANCE OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction has been treated as an isolated problem. One has only
to contrast the jurisdictional decisions discussed in this Article with the
225. Morganstern v. Mariott-Hot Shoppes, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 75, 77 (D. Md. 1967). But see
Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
226. See supra note 43.
227. Bryson v. Northlake Hilton, 407 F. Supp. 73 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (hotel guest's forum bur-
dened commerce against franchisee of national chain). Where minimum jurisdictional contacts
are predicated on the location of negotiations, as in Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prods.,
Inc., 619 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1980), it is not unlikely to find that breach and damages were incurred
elsewhere and that the long-arm defendant has fewer resources for distant defense.
228. Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 114, 117 N.W.2d
732, 735 (1962).
229. Id. at 114-15, 117 N.W.2d at 736; Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 255-56, 342 P.2d
871, 874-75 (1959).
230. See supra note 83.
231. See supra note 82.
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cases built on Goldberg v. Kely2 32 to understand the significance of this
difference. In the cases involving the right to an administrative hear-
ing, the Court has had to determine how much process was due. This
necessitated a look not at single rules but at all rules in combination. 33
A view of due process based on the inequalities among litigants would
force the Court to expand its perspective and discretion in a similar
way. Whether jurisdictional rules would have much, if any, effect on
reducing the risk of error would depend on the rules governing solicita-
tion and selection of counsel, and financing of litigation. If financing is
provided and the client-counsel relationship is facilitated, there may be
no extra burden on the parties as a result of out-of-state litigation.234
Where these conditions are not present, however, jurisdictional deci-
sions may affect the course of the lawsuit. Increasing the size of the
problem the courts face may not be an advantage. If due process does
govern jurisdiction, however, jurisdictional analysis may have to be as
broad as the analysis of administrative procedure has been.
If there were an adequate market in regard to the costs of litigation,
it would make little difference for the fair and efficient handling of le-
gal disputes whether the rules place the burdens initially on the plaintiff
or the defendant.3 S Parties could bargain with each other and employ
outside agents, resources, and services to manage the burdens. In the
absence of such a market, jurisdictional rules may be a significant
constraint.
The Legal Services Corporation, legal insurance, group plans, and
ideological organizations have made some inroads against the isolation
of litigants in recent years. It is, however, often illegal to assign a cause
of action.236 Lawyers may advance but not pay the costs of litigation2
37
and may finance their own fees only in well-defined though important
classes of plaintiffs litigation.2 38 This is largely the result of the limita-
tion on the assessment of attorneys' fees to the loser.239 Firms differ in
232. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
233. L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at 539-57.
234. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 37 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982-83).
235. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
236. N.Y. Jud. L. § 489 (McKinney 1968). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1976) (restricts jurisdiction
over assigned causes of action even where legal).
237. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY, DR 5-103 (1979).
238. Torts, securities, antitrust, and class actions are major categories. See generally Schwartz
& Mitchell, supra note 185.
239. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Changing the attorneys'
fees rules could threaten such campaigns as the NAACP's lawsuit against the school board in
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their ability to finance litigation. Attorneys are usually barred from
seeking economies of scale by the rules against client solicitation.240
Jurisdiction is a problem because the legally regulated market handles
litigation costs so poorly.
Thus, it may be better to alter the practice requirements for plead-
ing241 and let the judge set a convenient venue on the basis of small
trial costs. Several writers have urged the substitution of venue provi-
sions similar to title 28, section 1404(a) of the United States Code for
jurisdictional provisions to avoid statute of limitations problems, dis-
missal, and the cost and inconvenience of restarting an action.242 If,
however, we eliminate the jurisdictional objection and dismissal for
failure to file in the appropriate district, the consequences would in-
elude intentional-but difficult to prove-filing in inconvenient fo-
rums. Under current rules the defendant must first deal with the
problems of defending in the inconvenient forum before he can have
the case transferred or even default reopened.243 The seriously inconve-
nient initial forum is the strongest justification for the right of collateral
attack. The failure of venue doctrine to provide for collateral attack in
appropriate cases is the most serious weakness of the proposal to substi-
tute venue for jurisdiction. Venue doctrine would prove much more
acceptable if practice rules made the initial problems of pleading and
motions much less expensive relative to small cases.
CONCLUSIONS
Jurisdictional rules might, of course, be based on something other
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), by forcing a fledgling organization to foot its
opponent's bills following early losses. See, e.g., R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 155-58
(1976) (discussion of Hocutt v. Wilson, No. 1-188 Civ. (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 1933)). See
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1936) (ruling against the civil rights plaintiffs in a voting case).
It may be possible to avoid such problems but to do so would require extensive and thoughtful
study. For an example of the danger of unwanted deterrence via shifting the burden of attorneys'
fees, see Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981) (involving costs); Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (involving attorneys' fee in which civil rights plaintiffs were
treated differently than civil rights defendants with respect to court costs).
240. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103, 104 (1979).
241. But see Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
242. See Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 OR. L. REV. 103 (1971);
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 312-14 (1956). On the
relation between 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) and forum non conveniens doctrine, see 1 J. MOORE,
supra note 52, at 0.14515].
243. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1976).
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than due process. But if due process is the source of limitation it poorly
explains the pattern of jurisdictional rules. The Court has revived sov-
ereignty when it has become insignificant. While the Court could make
good use of an interpretation of due process based on the right of self-
determination, it has focused on self-determination in contexts which
are far from foremost in the parties' minds.
Justice Black may have engaged in rhetorical flourishes in McGee
and Traveler's Health. His discussion of the relative position of the
parties, however, is at once easy to fit within fundamental approaches
to due process but pregnant with difficulties of interpretation. To take
his argument seriously would require considerable restructuring of our
understanding of jurisdiction.
From the perspective of accuracy of decisionmaking, which is well
grounded in the due process clause, it is more appropriate, instead of
looking at one party, to look at both. Even if the Szukhent brothers
signed their contract in New York, perhaps the rental company should
be required to sue at the Szukhents' home.2' Whether that would
make the trial less expensive would depend on the nature of the Szuk-
hent brothers' defenses.
Perhaps another private party should be entitled to jurisdiction in
Texas regarding a contract with Mrs. McGee, who lives in California,
but International Life Insurance Company should not.245 Perhaps the
television repairman should be entitled to jurisdiction against Grey in
Ohio but American Radiator should not.2' 6 And perhaps the stock-
holder should have been able to get jurisdiction in Delaware against
the officers of Greyhound but an institutional creditor should have
been required to sue in Arizona. 2 47 To allow these decisions to control,
however, would make jurisdiction both unwieldy and hard to predict.
Because convenience leads in divergent directions, jurisdictional
doctrine can only serve to balance the competing interests involved or
engage in categorical approximations. Given the cost of ascertaining
jurisdictional facts, it may be appropriate simply to identify classes of
244. See supra note 127.
245. Compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 335 U.S. 220 (1957) with Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 277 (1937).
246. Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) with Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus. Inc., 117 N.W.2d 732,
735 (Minn. 1982).
247. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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cases which ordinarily should be pursued in plaintiffs' or defendants'
jurisdiction on the basis of the parties' typical relative resources rather
than to individualize determinations based on the actual resources of
litigants before the Court. Such considerations would justify the other-
wise usually inapplicable right of collateral attack but would clash
sharply with the Court's playing of its recent jurisdictional quartet.
The significance of such questions, however, may also depend on the
provisions for handling interstate legal business, the license to practice,
provision for referral, and the growth of multistate firms and legal in-
surance plans. The significance of those questions may similarly de-
pend on provisions for counsel and counsel fees. Jurisdiction is not an
island entire unto itself.
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APPENDIX I
The closest available data are based on the evidence of defendant's choice of
direct or collateral attack and their decisions to default on merchandising and
personal loan contracts in New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia in
1967. It is difficult to base any conclusions on that data. D. CAPLOVITZ, CON-
SUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 206-07, 210-12
(1974). A subsequent attempt to define the problems statistically ran aground
on a failure to cross tabulate relevant variables including the size of the case.
See Rosen, Nearer Thy Court to Thee: A Proposalfor a More Convenient Fo-
rumfor Defendants in Consumer Cases, 8 CONN. L. REv. 530, 534-47 (1976).
In the Caplovitz study, only 4% of those served in New York appeared in
court in contrast to 34% and 36% in Detroit and Chicago, respectively. D.
CAPLOVITZ, supra, at 204. Caplovitz concluded that the venue provisions in
New York were a major reason for default. Id. at 207. New York permitted
venue to be placed in either the county of the plaintiffs residence or that of
defendant. See N.Y. CiV. PREC. LAW § 503 (Consol. 1978 & Supp. 1982);
N.Y. CITY Civ. CT. ACT § 301 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981-82). Both sec-
tions have since been amended to narrow jurisdiction in consumer cases. N.Y.
CITY Civ. CT. ACT §§ 201-212 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981-82). Fully 75%
of the cases examined by Caplovitz and his researchers were not in the defend-
ant's county. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra, at 206-07. But Caplovitz does not reveal
how residence may have correlated with default in New York City. Nearly
20% of debtors in default in New York City, but only 7% in Detroit, and 4% in
Chicago, told interviewers that they did not know where they were supposed
to go or that they were afraid to go to court. Id. at 205. Only 7% to 14% in
each city told the interviewers that they failed to appear for lack of a defense.
An additional 10% to 14% admitted forgetting or otherwise having no reason
for failure to appear. Id. These figures may understate the number of defend-
ants who had a defense by excluding those unaware of their legal rights. No
effort was made to determine whether any of those respondents did in fact
have a meritorious defense. A substantial proportion related information to
the interviewers which suggested that they did have a defense, id. at 41-42,
suggesting that nearly half of the debtors in a default were deceived on at least
two of three standard items. A smaller percentage volunteered deception as a
reason for nonpayment. Id. at 49-55. Caplovitz concluded:
That fully three fourths of the New York debtors did not live in the same
borough in which they were being sued would appear to be a factor in the
failure of all but a handful to answer the summons, although virtually
none of the debtors offered as a reason for their nonappearance their not
knowing where the Court was located, how to get to it, or the trip being
too difficult.
Id. at 207. The data from each city are not strictly comparable because
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Caplovitz compared the multicounty, multicourthouse New York system to a
single courthouse each in Chicago and Detroit. Id. at 210. The differences
observed may also relate to unfamiliarity with the area, id. at 210, or to differ-
ences in the availability of credit or the prevalence of "sewer service" (if the
interviewees incorrectly identified or remembered service of the summons).
Id. at 192-95. (The author is indebted to Professor Allen Redlich for this
point). That such structural differences may be at work is evidenced by the
small impact of the requirement of bilingual summonses and a narrowing of
venue allegations which the clerks of the respective Courts of New York City
would accept. Id. at 211-12. Moreover, Caplovitz did not compare the default
rates within New York City in cases of home county and distant county litiga-
tion. Thus, Caplovitz was not able to put a figure even on this narrow class of
the problem.
Based on the Caplovitz data the Special Committee on Consumer Affairs of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York attacked the venue provi-
sions for consumer cases. The Special Committee on Consumer Affairs, 4
New York Consumer Law Center, 29 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 213, 214 (1974).
See Committee on Legal Assistance, Does a Vendee Under an Installment
Sales Contract Receive 4dequate Notice of a Suit Instituted By a Vendor?, 23
REc. A.B. CiTY N.Y. 263, 265 (1968). Following these attacks New York's
CPLR section 503(f) was amended in 1973, Act of May 1, 1973, ch. 238, 1973
N.Y. Laws § 3, to restrict venue to the residence of the defendant in consumer
cases. Similar changes were made in the New York City Civil Court Act sec-
tion 301(a). Id. § 5. Professor Siegal's commentary on the Civil Court Act
amendments noted the effort to curtail harassment by multicounty corporate
defendants. Professor McLaughlin's commentary to section 503(f) notes that
prior practice permitted suit hundreds of miles from defendant's home if the
plaintiff chose to take advantage of a home office in New York City for venue
purposes. N.Y. Civ. PRoc. LAW § 503 commentary on assignees-residence
(McKinney 1976). Governor Rockefeller approved the change, saying "The
commencement of a suit in a place that is highly inconvenient to the debtor
has the effect of discouraging and indeed, preventing many debtors from ap-
pearing in the action and asserting what would otherwise constitute a valid
defense." 1973 N.Y. LAWS 2340 (1973).
Data has not been located which might show the effects of this change.
Chart I traces the percentage of default judgments in the Supreme Court and
Civil Court where the change was made and the County Court where no
change was made. The jurisdiction of each court, however, differs substan-
tially and the data is not comparable. Also, the reporting system for the Civil
Court unfortunately changed in 1973 and the categories for all courts were
broader than the change, thus masking any decrease in default judgments. It
can therefore only be presumed, though the presumption seems quite reason-
[Vol. 60:1291
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able, that venue and jurisdiction provisions make a significant difference in the
results of litigation, unrelated to the bona fide nature of the claims. In certain
classes of cases the presumption would seem to be at least as true for interstate
jurisdictional problems as for intrastate venue problems.
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APPENDIX II
COLLATERAL VERSUS DIRECT ATTACK
Charts II through IV demonstrate the close relationship between the size of
the claim and the choice of method for attacking jurisdiction. The difference
between the won/lost percentage on these motions was very slight. Collateral
attack was successful in 5 out of 12 of the listed cases, and 8 out of 19 where
cases in which amounts were not mentioned are included. Similarly, 6 out of
15 of the direct attacks succeeded in the listed cases and 21 out of 47 succeeded
if direct attack cases in which amounts were not mentioned are included.
CHART II
% OF CASES ATTACKING JUDGMENT
(based on Charts III-IV below)
Collaterally
18.18
63.64
72.73
90.91
90.91
Median $9,851.63
(11 cases)
Directly*
7.69
23.08
38.46
46.15
61.54
Median $50,000
(13 cases)
Excluding the support order in Bergdoll v. Whitley, 598 S.W.2d 932 (rex. Civ. App. 1980).
CHART III
CASES PURSUING COLLATERAL ATTACK
Based on cases appearing in 13-27 GENERAL DIGEST, FiFTH SERIES (West
1979-80), in which a dollar amount is identified, listed under West Key Num-
bers as follows:
JUDGMENT (COLL. ATT.: 470-523)
(FOR JMT.: 813-832)
and
COURTS
AMOUNT
$ 2,286.01
3,510.00
7,698.06
8,000.00
JURISDICTION OF PERSON: 10, 11, 12)
CASE
Attwell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 954 (1980).
Pinna v. Davis, 67 App. Div.2d 967, 413 N.Y.S.2d 460
(1979).
Wulf Oil Corp. v. Grebe Drilling Co., 93 Mich. App. 793,
287 N.W.2d 344 (1979).
Liberty Leasing Co. v. Still, 582 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979).
Under
$ 5,001
10,000
15,000
31,000
100,000
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8,456.37 First Nat'l Bank v. Collins, 372 So.2d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
9,851.63 Bevins v. Comet Cas. Co., 71 IM. App. 3d 758, 390 N.E.2d
500 (1979).
9,923.04 Brockman Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Zollar, 3 Kan, App. 2d
477, 596 P.2d 827 (1979).
13,069.38 Gladding Corp. v. Balco Pedrick Parts, 429 N.Y.S.2d 940
(1980).
29,338.00 Haire v. Eide, 150 Ga. App. 52, 256 S.E.2d 658 (1979).
30,000.00 McDermond v. Siemans, 607 P.2d 108 (Nev. 1980).
250,000.00 Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp.
404 (S.D. Tex.), vacated, 665 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1980).
CHART IV
CASES PURSUING DIRECT ATTACK
Based on cases appearing in 13-27 GENERAL DIGEST, FIFTH SERIES (West
1979-80), in which a dollar amount is identified, listed under West Key Num-
bers as follows:
COURTS (JURISDIcTION OF PERSON: 10, 11, 12)
AMOUNT CASE
$ 5,000.00
5,825.00
9,000.00
10,160.22
14,609.24
21,252.59
50,000.00+
60,000.00
174,074.00
327,347.42
Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Lexington United Corp., 86 Ill
App.3d 909, 407 N.E.2d 944 (1980), at'd, 87 Ill.2d 190,
429 N.E.2d 847 (1981).
Ahlers v. Ahlers, 384 So.2d 474 (La. 1980).
Cofinco of Seattle, Ltd. v. Weiss, 25 Wash. App. 195,
605 P.2d 794 (1980).
Hallibarton Co. v. Texana Oil Co., 471 F. Supp. 1017
(D. Colo. 1979) (two defendants).
United Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 296 N.C. 510,
251 S.E.2d 610 (1979).
H.V. Allen Co. v. Quip-Matic, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 40,
266 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis.2d 683,
273 N.W.2d 285 (1979).
Hall, Morse, Gallagher & Andersen v. Koch & Koch,
119 N.H. 639, 406 A.2d 962 (1979).
Schell v. Tri-State Irrigation, 22 Wash. App. 788, 591
P.2d 1222 (1979).
Biltmore Moving & Storage Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 606
F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1979).
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522,000.00
1,260,000.00
$250/mo.
(increase in
support
order)
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Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Lammis, 596 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.
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